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Nowadays, chip design and chip fabrication are normally conducted separately
by independent companies. Most integrated circuit (IC) design companies are now
adopting a fab-less model: they outsource the chip fabrication to offshore foundries
while concentrating their effort and resource on the chip design. Although it is
cost-effective, the outsourced design faces various security threats since the offshore
foundries might not be trustworthy. Attacks on the outsourced IC design can take
on many forms, such as piracy, counterfeiting, overproduction and malicious modifi-
cation, which are referred to as IC supply chain attacks. In this work, we investigate
several circuit design obfuscation techniques to prevent the IC supply chain attacks
by untrusted foundries.
Logic locking is a gate-level design obfuscation technique that’s proposed to
protect the outsourced IC designs from piracy and counterfeiting by untrusted
foundries. A locked IC preserves the correct functionality only when a correct
key is provided. Recently, the security of logic locking is threatened by a strong
attack called SAT attack, which can decipher the correct key of most logic locking
techniques within a few hours even for a reasonably large key-size. In this disser-
tation, we investigate design techniques to improve the security of logic locking in
three directions. Firstly, we propose a new locking technique called Anti-SAT to
thwart the SAT attack. The Anti-SAT can make the complexity of SAT attack
grow exponentially in key-size, hence making the attack computationally infeasible.
Secondly, we consider an approximate version of SAT attack and investigate its ap-
plication on fault-tolerant hardware such as neural network chips. Countermeasure
to this approximate SAT attack is proposed and validated with rigorous proof and
experiments. Lastly, we explore new opportunities in obfuscating the parametric
characteristics of a circuit design (e.g., timing) so that another layer of defense can
be added to existing countermeasures.
Split fabrication based on 3D integration technology is another approach to
obfuscate the outsourced IC designs. 3D integration is a technology that integrates
multiple 2D dies to create a single high-performance chip, referred to as 3D IC.
With 3D integration, a designer can choose a portion of IC design at his discretion
and send them to a trusted foundry for secure fabrication while outsourcing the
rest to untrusted foundries for advanced fabrication technology. In this dissertation,
we propose a security-aware physical design flow for interposer-based 3D IC (also
known as 2.5D IC). The design flow consists of security-aware partitioning and
placement phases, which aim at obfuscating the circuit while preventing potential
attacks such as proximity attack. Simulation results show that our proposed design
flow is effective for producing secure chip layouts against the IC supply chain attacks.
The circuit design obfuscation techniques presented in this dissertation enable
future chip designers to take security into consideration at an early phase while
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Traditionally, cyber-security studies focus mainly on software and information
security, which aims at protecting the confidentiality and integrity of data that is
computed and transmitted among multiple parties. Software-oriented security is
developed in forms such as password, encryption and decryption, digital signature,
anti-virus software, crypto-currency, etc. When developing these software-based
security applications, the underlying hardware systems (i.e., electronic systems,
chips, ICs) that provide the computation and communication of the software are
normally assumed to be secure and reliable. However, such security assumptions
about hardware cannot be easily guaranteed, because hardware systems could also
have vulnerabilities and could be attacked. In recent years, people have discovered
more and more hardware-based security threats. Hardware security threats could
be due to unintended human mistakes or oversight during design time. For example,
recent attacks Meltdown [1] and Spectre [2] exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern
processors to develop an effective attack scheme which allows attackers to steal data
that is processed on the hardware. A software patch to fix this hardware flaw could
take up to 25% performance overhead [3]. Besides unintended design flaws, hardware
security threats could also be due to malicious tampering that is performed during
1
chip design and fabrication. Recent reports [4–6] have discovered malicious back-
doors (also known as hardware Trojans) that are inserted into IC designs which
can stealthily make the hardware system malfunction. In addition to hardware
tampering, hardware design piracy and counterfeiting have become a significant issue
in modern IC supply chain. According to a report by IHS Technology, the potential
annual financial risks for the global electronics supply chain due to counterfeiting was
estimated to be over $169 billion in 2011 [7]. These hardware attacks pose significant
security threats to both consumer electronics and mission-critical systems.
1.1 Taxonomy of Hardware Attacks
Hardware attacks can take many forms and they can happen during different
stages of an IC’s life cycle. To begin with, attacks on hardware can happen during
its design and fabrication, which are referred to as supply chain attacks. Modern
chips go through a complicated supply chain of design, fabrication, packaging, and
assembly, as shown in Fig. 1.1. Each stage of the IC supply chain involves many
global suppliers which could be possibly untrustworthy. Hardware designs might be
tampered or pirated by untrusted parties in the IC supply chain, resulting in a huge
economic loss to most IC design companies. Furthermore, attacks can also happen
after the hardware is deployed to end users, which are referred to as post-deployment
attacks. For example, malicious end users might want to reverse-engineer the chips
in order to obtain its implementation details. Besides, they might want to identify
hardware vulnerabilities and use them to access valuable data that is processed on
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Figure 1.1: IC supply chain and its security threats.
the chips. In this section, we provide a detailed taxonomy of hardware attacks,
including IC supply chain attacks and post-deployment attacks.
1.1.1 IC Supply Chain Attacks
Fig. 1.1 shows an overview of modern IC supply chain. In general, it can be
divided into two phases:
• Design Phase. In the design phase, an abstract design specification is first de-
scribed using register-transfer level (RTL) language such as Verilog and then
synthesized into a gate-level netlist using commercial design and synthesis
tools. After that, physical design tools are used to produce a layout for the
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netlist. The layout file describes the physical shapes, locations, and routing
of different gates in the netlist, which is used as a reference for chip fabrica-
tion. Nowadays, it’s very common for designers to integrate hardware designs
that are purchased from other companies, which are known as third-party
Intellectual Property (IP).
• Fabrication Phase. In the fabrication phase, the layout is used to generate
masks for chip fabrication. After that, the chips are packaged and assembled
into a printed circuit board (PCB) to produce the final electronic system. To
access advanced semiconductor technology at a low cost, most IC designs are
now outsourced to an off-shore foundry for chip fabrication. Once the layouts
are sent to the foundries, they are not under the direct control or monitoring
of the designer.
Different attacks can happen in different phases of the IC supply chain. The follow-
ing summarizes potential attacks in each phase.
1.1.1.1 Attacks in Design Phase
Security threats in the design phase come from three sources, malicious de-
signer, untrusted third-party IPs, and untrusted third-party design tools. First of
all, a rogue employee in the design team can steal or modify the chip design. This
is the most dangerous threat in the design phase because the rogue employee has
full access to the design. Besides the malicious insiders, third-party IPs which are
provided by untrusted IP vendors can also secretly sabotage the hardware design.
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Although integrating third-party IPs can expedite the design process, it allows at-
tackers (the IP vendors) to insert malicious backdoor that could make the chip
malfunction under certain circumstances. Lastly, third-party design tools also pose
potential threats to hardware design. Often times, designers simply rely on the
automatic design optimization and verification processes offered by the tools. How-
ever, the resulting design might be tampered or undermined during these automatic
design processes.
To summarize, two attacks can happen during the design phase:
• IP piracy. The objective of IP piracy attack is to steal the hardware design,
illegally claim the ownership and use them in an unauthorized way. IP piracy
can be conducted by a rogue employee in the design team. The employee can
steal the RTL or gate-level designs and sell them to other design companies
to gain profits.
• Hardware Trojan (HT). HTs refer to the malicious modifications or backdoors
that can 1) change or nullify some functionalities [8] and 2) undermine the IC’s
performance and reliability [9]. HTs can be inserted during the design phase
by rogue employees in the design team, untrusted third-party IP vendors or
untrusted third-party design tools.
1.1.1.2 Attacks in Fabrication Phase
Security threats in the fabrication phase mainly come from the malicious in-
sider in the fabrication foundries. To access advanced semiconductor technology
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at a lower cost, most IC design companies are now outsourcing their IC designs to
an offshore foundry for fabrication. However, the offshore foundry might not be
trustworthy. Without direct control and monitoring from the design company, a
malicious insider in the foundry can pirate or tamper the IC designs. The following
summarizes potential attacks that can happen during the outsourced fabrication
phase.
• IP Piracy. IP piracy can be conducted by a malicious foundry. Since the
foundry has access to the layout of the hardware design, it can analyze the
layout and use state-of-the-art IC reverse engineering techniques [10] to gain
knowledge of the design at different levels (e.g., RTL or gate-level). Later, the
malicious foundry can benefit from selling the extracted design knowledge and
details to other design companies
• IC Overproduction. This attack is conducted by malicious fabrication foundries
which overproduce and sell extra copies of chips for profit. To reduce cost,
these overbuilt ICs might not be subject to a complete testing process. As
a result, some unauthorized and low-quality ICs may end up being packaged
and sold to the market, which renders both economic and reputation loss to
the design company.
• Counterfeiting. This attack is related to the production and distribution of
out-of-spec, fake, or recycled chips [11]. Out-of-spec ICs (which fail some
quality tests) are normally supplied by malicious foundries. During testing,
out-of-spec chips can be withheld by the foundry and marked as qualified
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chips. Later, these chips can be sold to the market, without the designer being
aware of it. Fake and recycled chips are other forms of counterfeited chips.
For example, an old-generation chip can be relabeled into a new-generation
one. These counterfeited chips could be integrated into a hardware system by
attackers during chip packaging and assembly.
• Hardware Trojan (HT). HTs can be inserted during the fabrication phase by
a malicious foundry. The attacker can modify the layout to change the chip’s
functionality or undermine its performance and reliability.
1.1.2 Post-deployment Attacks
After the hardware are deployed to the users, various attacks can be performed
to tamper the hardware or the data that’s processed on it. Following describes two
common hardware-based attacks in the post-deployment phase.
• Reverse Engineering. In this attack, a malicious user wants to obtain imple-
mentation details of the hardware. He can use state-of-the-art reverse engi-
neering technique [10] to extract valuable knowledge which might be used for
further attacks such as producing counterfeited ICs. Compared to layout-level
reverse engineering by malicious foundries (as discussed in Section 1.1.1.2),
chip-level reverse engineering by end users is harder because it requires more
steps such as chip decapsulation and delayering.
• Side-channel attack (SCA). In this attack, a malicious user exploits physical
characteristics of a hardware system (e.g., power [12, 13], run time [14, 15],
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electromagnetic (EM) emission [16–18] etc.) to learn the secret data that is
processed on the hardware. The aforementioned Meltdown [1] and Spectre [2]
attacks are examples of SCAs.
The taxonomy of hardware-based attacks is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. These
emerging hardware security threats motivate researchers to develop effective design
techniques to enhance the security of modern chips.
Figure 1.2: Taxonomy of hardware-based attack.
1.2 Contributions and Thesis Organization
1.2.1 Focus of This Dissertation
In this dissertation, we concentrate on the IC supply chain security for mod-
ern chips with a focus on security threats in the fabrication phase. The main theme
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of this work is to develop novel design techniques to enhance the security of out-
sourced IC designs that are fabricated in possibly untrustworthy foundries. We
investigate new attack strategies and propose security-aware design techniques that
aim at thwarting the supply chain attacks including IP piracy, overproduction and
counterfeiting by untrusted foundries. These design techniques can be utilized to en-
hance trust between design companies and fabrication foundries so that a mutually
beneficial cooperation can be maintained.
1.2.2 Contributions
One set of techniques to protect the outsourced IC designs is to obfuscate the
functionality and implementation detail of the outsourced circuit design so as to
confuse the untrusted foundry. Without knowing the correct functionality or im-
plementation, an attacker cannot obtain the original circuit design or overproduce
any usable chips. Various circuit obfuscation techniques have been proposed, in-
cluding IC metering [19], logic locking [20] and split fabrication [21]. These circuit
obfuscation techniques, however, have been shown to have vulnerabilities and could
be attacked in recent literature [22–30]. De-obfuscation attacks have been proposed
to de-obfuscate the circuit and recover the original design. The vulnerabilities in
existing circuit obfuscation techniques motivate this work to develop new and more
secure countermeasures.
The first contribution of this work is to enhance the security of existing circuit
obfuscation techniques (e.g., logic locking) so that de-obfuscation attacks would be
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computationally infeasible. We have investigated various attacks on logic locking
and developed countermeasures that can thwart such attacks in a provably-secure
manner. The second contribution of this work is to investigate the security of ex-
isting logic locking techniques when applied to emerging hardware design such as
neural network chips. We proposed new attack and defense strategies to enhance
the security of locking neural chips. The third contribution of this work is to de-
velop completely new design techniques that exploit new obfuscation possibilities in
hardware design. For example, conventional circuit obfuscation techniques aim at
obfuscating the digital aspects (e.g., the Boolean functionality) of a circuit while its
counterpart, the analog aspects (e.g., timing, power, etc.) are not fully exploited.
We explore new opportunities in obfuscating the parametric characteristics so that
another layer of defense can be added to existing countermeasures. In addition,
we explore emerging fabrication technologies (e.g., 3D integration) for obfuscation,
which opens new opportunities in protecting the outsourced IC design. Overall, we
develop the following design obfuscation techniques to enhance chip security against
untrusted foundries.
• Anti-SAT: Secure Logic Locking Against SAT Attack. Logic locking is
a circuit obfuscation technique that has been proposed to protect outsourced
IC designs from piracy and counterfeiting by untrusted foundries. A locked
IC preserves the correct functionality only when a correct key is provided.
Recently, the security of logic locking is threatened by a new satisfiability
(SAT) checking based attack, denoted as SAT attack [24]. The SAT attack
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can decipher the correct key of most logic locking techniques within a few
hours even for a reasonably large number of keys. In this work, we present a
circuit block (referred to as Anti-SAT block) to thwart the SAT attack. We
show that the number of SAT attack iterations required to reveal the correct
key in a circuit comprising an Anti-SAT block is an exponential function of
the key-size thereby making the SAT attack computationally infeasible.
• Strong Anti-SAT: Secure Logic Locking for Neural Network Chips.
In this work, we investigate the security of logic locking when it’s applied
to a neural network chip. Locking neural chips is not the same as locking
conventional chips in two aspects. Firstly, most neural network applications
are inherently error-tolerant. The classification accuracy of a neural network
would be acceptable even when some of its underlying computations are incor-
rect. This can be exploited by an attacker who can just find an approximate
key instead of a correct key to approximately unlock the chip such that it
can output correctly for most inputs. Secondly, most neural network models
are tune-able (e.g., by fine-tuning the weight values). An attacker can adjust
his own neural models to accommodate the approximately-unlocked neural
chips, hence further improving the classification accuracy. To address these
new challenges, we propose a novel locking technique called Strong Anti-SAT
to protect the neural chips against untrusted foundries.
• Delay Locking: Security Enhancement of Logic Locking Against
Overproduction and Counterfeiting. In this work, we propose a new
11
obfuscation technique called delay locking. For delay locking, the key to a
locked circuit not only determines its functionality but also its timing profile.
A functionality-correct but timing-incorrect key will result in timing violations
and thus make the circuit malfunction. With delay locking, functionality ori-
ented attacks (e.g., SAT attack) are thwarted because they cannot be utilized
to decipher a timing-correct key.
• Security-aware Design Flow for 2.5D IC Split Fabrication. 3D in-
tegration is a technology that integrates multiple 2D dies to create a single
high-performance chip, referred to as 3D IC. With 3D integration, a designer
can choose a portion of layers at his discretion and fabricate them in a trusted
foundry while outsourcing the rest to untrusted foundries for advanced fab-
rication technology. This split fabrication strategy of 3D ICs creates a new
opportunity to obfuscate the outsourced designs. In this work, we propose a
security-aware physical design flow for interposer-based 3D IC (also known as
2.5D IC) technology to prevent supply chain attacks by untrusted foundries.
1.2.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we intro-
duce the supply chain attacks by untrusted foundries and summarize various circuit
obfuscation techniques that have been proposed to prevent IC designs from being
pirated, overproduced or counterfeited. In Chapter 3, we discuss a new logic lock-
ing technique called Anti-SAT and validate its security against SAT attack. These
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results have been published in [31,32]. In Chapter 4, we first investigate new attack
strategies for a neural chip that’s locked with Anti-SAT. Based on the attack results,
we discuss a new defense called Strong Anti-SAT to enhance the security of logic
locking for neural chips. In Chapter 5, we describe a new obfuscation technique
called delay locking that obfuscates the timing profile of an IC design. The results
have been published in [33]. In Chapter 6, we introduce a security-aware design flow
for 2.5D IC split fabrication. Part of the results were published in [34–38]. Finally,
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and discusses future work.
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Chapter 2: Background
In this chapter, we give an overview of supply chain attacks in fabrication
phase with a focus on hardware IP threats. We will describe the attack model,
attack schemes and summarize various types of attack mitigation techniques.
2.1 Supply Chain Attacks for IP Piracy
As introduced in Section 1.1.1, IC designs are increasingly outsourced to an
offshore foundry for fabrication. Since the foundry might not be trustworthy, the
outsourced IC design might be pirated, overproduced, counterfeited or maliciously
modified. In this dissertation, we focus on hardware IP threats. We assume that the
attacker is an untrusted foundry and its primary objective is to steal the hardware
IP or overproduce/counterfeit the chips to make profits. However, as design tech-
niques such as circuit obfuscations (which will be discussed in Section 2.2) have been
proposed to thwart the supply chain attacks, the attacker might have to circumvent
these countermeasures before performing further attacks. Following sections will
formally describe the attack model and attack schemes.
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2.1.1 Attack Model
We assume that the attacker is an untrusted foundry which fabricates chips
for an IC design company (designer). The attacker’s objective is to 1) learn about
the design implementation and steal the IC design and 2) overproduce or counterfeit
the IC design. The untrusted foundry has access to two components:
1. Layout files of an IC design, provided by the IC design company. These out-
sourced layout files are assumed to be correctly and securely designed using
trusted Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools for logic synthesis and
physical design. We assume that the attacker has the ability to reverse-
engineer the layouts to obtain their gate-level netlists using state-of-the-art
IC reverse-engineering techniques [10]. Such reverse-engineering capability
enables the attacker to analyze and pirate the IC design.
2. A functional chip, obtained from the open market. This chip will function
correctly as a black-box, i.e., it will produce correct outputs but the imple-
mentation detail of the chip is not known. This component gives the attacker
the ability to query correct input/output responses from the functional chip.
As will be discussed later, such ability can help the attacker to circumvent
certain defense techniques.
The aforementioned attack model has been widely used in most works on hardware
IP protection against malicious foundries [22–24, 26, 36, 39–44]. In some research
works, only the first component is assumed to be accessible to attackers [27–29].
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2.1.2 Attack Schemes
We consider two attack schemes based on whether an outsourced design is
obfuscated or not.
• Design Without Obfuscation. If the outsourced design is not obfuscated, the
foundry can directly perform the supply chain attacks such as IP piracy, over-
production, and counterfeiting, as described in Section 1.1.1.2. It can reverse-
engineer the layout and pirate the IP, overproduce extra unauthorized chip
copies, and produce counterfeit products that utilize out-of-spec, fake or recy-
cled chips.
• Design With Obfuscation. If the outsourced design is obfuscated, the foundry
has to first de-obfuscate the circuit before performing the supply chain attacks.
As described in Section 2.1.1, the attacker has access to two components which
can be exploited for circuit de-obfuscation. The first component is the obfus-
cated layout files provided by the designer, which is accessible during the
fabrication phase. These layout files can be reverse-engineered to gate-level
netlists which can provide more information about the obfuscated design. The
second component is a functional chip, which is accessible only after the de-
signer has deployed the chips to the open market. This functional chip can be
used to query correct input/output patterns which could assist the attacker
in de-obfuscating the circuit.
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Figure 2.1: An IC design and fabrication flow enhanced with circuit obfuscation.
2.2 Circuit Obfuscation
The security threats in outsourced chip fabrication have heightened the need
for effective countermeasures. One set of techniques to prevent the supply chain at-
tacks is to obfuscate the functionality and implementation detail of the outsourced
circuit design so as to confuse the untrusted foundry. In this section, we will first
summarize various circuit obfuscation techniques. Then, we will introduce two ob-
fuscation techniques, namely logic locking and split fabrication, in more detail.
2.2.1 Overview of Circuit Obfuscation
Fig. 2.1 shows an IC design and fabrication flow that’s enhanced with circuit
obfuscation. During design time, a circuit design can be obfuscated at different
design stages to hide its functionality and implementation. After that, the lay-
out of the obfuscated design is outsourced to an untrusted foundry for fabrication.
Without knowing the correct functionality or implementation, an attacker cannot
reverse-engineer the original circuit design or overproduce any functional chips. Af-
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ter fabrication, the non-functional chips will be sent to the designer or trusted
third-party, which can de-obfuscate these chips to regain the functional chips and
sell them to market.
Circuit obfuscation can be implemented at different levels, namely finite-state-
machine (FSM) level, gate level, and layout level.
• FSM Level. FSM is a representation of the Boolean function of sequential
circuits. An FSM normally consists of inputs, outputs, states, and transitions.
Active metering [19] is an FSM-level obfuscation technique. In this technique,
an FSM is obfuscated by adding extra non-functional states and transitions.
To enter a valid functional state, one would need to provide a sequence of
inputs (called pass-key), which converts an initial non-functional state into a
valid functional state. Obfuscated FSMs can be integrated with other RTL
design to obfuscate its control and data flow, as proposed in [45,46].
• Gate Level. Obfuscation can also happen at the gate level after the Boolean
logic is synthesized into a gate-level netlist. Given a gate-level netlist, a de-
signer can obfuscate its combinational portion by modifying the original design
such that the functionality of obfuscated netlist are different from the original
one. The key aspect is that these netlist modifications should be recoverable by
the designer or other trustworthy parties after the chips are fabricated. Logic
locking 1 [20] is a gate-level obfuscation technique that obfuscates a netlist by
inserting a set of key-controlled logic gates (key-gates) and key-inputs. The
1Logic locking is also known as logic encryption [47] and logic obfuscation [22].
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locked netlist preserves the original functionality only when a correct key is
provided. On the other hand, a wrong key can cause faults inside the netlist
and make it output incorrectly. Chip Editor [48] is another gate-level cir-
cuit obfuscation technique. During design time, a designer can obfuscate the
gate-level netlist by adding extra gates and wires. After receiving the chips
fabricated in untrusted foundries, the designer or trusted third parties can
use focused ion beam (FIB) based chip edit technology to directly modify the
chips to nullify the extra gates or wires, thereby making the chips function
correctly [48].
• Layout Level. A circuit layout is typically composed of multiple metal layers
and device layers. At the layout level, a circuit can be obfuscated by splitting
its layout into two tiers: a trusted tier and an untrusted tier. The untrusted
tier consists of layers which require advanced semiconductor technology, so it is
outsourced to an untrusted foundry. On the other hand, the trusted tier which
contains less advanced layers can be fabricated in a trusted foundry for security.
The final integration of two tiers is also done securely in the trusted foundry.
This security-oriented fabrication strategy is called split fabrication [21]. By
having two tiers fabricated separately, the untrusted foundry could not have
access to the trusted tier and thus cannot have a complete view of the IC
design.
In the remaining of this section, we will discuss two obfuscation techniques
logic locking and split fabrication in more detail.
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Figure 2.2: Logic locking techniques: (a) overiew; (b) an original netlist; (c)
XOR/XNOR based; (d) MUX based; (e) LUT based.
2.2.2 Logic Locking
2.2.2.1 Basic Idea
Logic locking [20] is a gate-level obfuscation technique. It obfuscates the com-
binational part of a circuit design by inserting a set of key-controlled logic gates
(key-gates) and key-inputs. Fig. 2.2 shows the overview of logic locking techniques.
A circuit is locked by inserting a set of key-gates and key-inputs. The key-inputs
are connected to an on-chip memory and the locked IC preserves the correct func-
tionality only when a correct key is set to the on-chip memory. After inserting the
key-gates, the obfuscated netlist will be re-synthesized so that the key-gates can
blend into the original netlist, which prevents them from being identified and re-
moved. To prevent the untrusted foundry from probing internal signals of a running
chip, a tamper-proof chip protection shall be implemented.
Recent years have seen various logic locking techniques based on different key-
20
gate types and key-gate insertion algorithms. According to the key-gate types, they
can be classified into three major categories: XOR/XNOR based logic locking [20,
22, 47], multiplexer (MUX) based logic locking [23, 39, 47, 49] and Look-Up-Table
(LUT) based logic locking [50–52], as shown in Fig. 2.2(c-e). Besides these three
major types of key-gates, previous works have also investigated the use of AND/OR
gates [53] and other special logic blocks [45] as the key-gates. Among all, the
XOR/XNOR based logic locking has received the most attention mainly due to its
simple structure and low performance overhead.
Different key-gate insertion algorithms have also been proposed [20, 22, 23,
39, 47, 53], which aim at identifying the optimal locations for key-gates to improve
the security of the logic locking technique. The simplest algorithm is the random
insertion [20], where key-gates are distributed randomly to different locations of
the netlist. To increase fault impact, a fault-analysis based insertion algorithm [47]
proposed to insert the key-gates at locations that can maximally corrupt the primary
outputs (POs) when an incorrect key is given. This algorithm ensures that the
functionality of the locked circuit (with an incorrect key) would deviate substantially
from the original one. Following these two prior works [20, 47], researchers have
started to develop key-learning attacks and proposed new logic locking algorithms
to thwart such attacks [22, 23,39,53].
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2.2.2.2 Attacks on Logic Locking
The attacks on logic locking assume that the attacker has access to two com-
ponents: 1) a locked netlist which can be obtained by reverse-engineering the layout
files provided by the designer and 2) an unlocked functional chip obtained from open
market, as mentioned earlier in Section 2.1.1. The attack objective is to obtain the
correct key by utilizing these two components.
• Brute-force Attack [39]. A circuit netlist normally has multiple outputs. The
functionality of each output is determined by a slice of sub-netlist that’s re-
ferred to as logic cone. In this attack, an attacker firstly segments a locked
netlist into multiple logic cones, each containing a subset of keys. After that,
the attacker targets the logic cones one by one, from the simplest (the one has
the least keys) to the most complicated (the one has the most keys). For each
logic cone, a brute-force search attack is used to find a correct key. To thwart
this attack, a logic-cone analysis based insertion algorithm was proposed to
increase the number of key-gates per logic cone using MUX based key-gates.
• Hill-climbing Search Attack [23]. This attack is based on the assumption that
the output correctness of a locked circuit is proportional to the correctness of
a key. It uses a hill-climbing based searching algorithm that toggles a guessed
key bit-by-bit to search a direction that can improve output correctness (for
a set of test inputs). The attack terminates when the guessed key can make a
circuit output correctly for the test set. To thwart this attack, a MUX-based
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gradient-obfuscated locking method was proposed which aims at reducing the
sensitivity of circuit outputs to the key toggle.
• Key-sensitizing Attack [22]. This attack uses automatic test pattern genera-
tion (ATPG) tool to find a set of input patterns that can sensitize the correct
key values to POs. The attacker first analyzes the locked netlist to find specific
input pattern that can create a path for keys to be sensitized to POs. Then,
he can apply that input on an unlocked functional chip and observe the correct
key. To mitigate this attack, an interference-analysis based insertion algorithm
called Strong Logic Locking (SLL) was proposed which places the key-gates
at locations with strong interferences (i.e., not dispersed or isolated). This
increases the difficulty of finding an effective sensitizing path from key-inputs
to POs.
• Side-channel Attacks (SCAs) [26, 40]. In [26], a Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) based SCA was proposed to find the correct key by statistically corre-
lating the power trace and the key values. To counter this attack, the authors
suggest to 1) increase the key-input to primary input ratio in a given logic
cone and 2) insert key-gates at selected locations such that incorrect key bi-
ases the POs towards a constant value on average. In [40], a finer-grain power
SCA based on Template Analysis (TA) was proposed. It monitors power trace
samples with respect to different logic depths (determined by arrival time of
each gate) from the functional chip. This information is used as a template
to guide finding the correct keys. Potential direction to counter the TA is to
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equalize the logic depths of all key-gates through specific layout design.
• SAT-based Attacks [24,41–44]. Recently, the security of logic locking is threat-
ened by a new attack called SAT attack [24], which can decipher the correct
key of most logic locking techniques [20,22,47,50,53] within a few hours even
for a reasonably large key-size. This attack iteratively solves SAT formulas
which can progressively eliminate the incorrect keys till the circuit is unlocked.
Based on [24], various SAT attack variants have been proposed, including ap-
proximate SAT (AppSAT) [41], Double-DIP [42], CycSAT [43] and model
checker [44]. These attacks extend the original SAT attack to enhance its
effectiveness. Developing secure countermeasures against SAT-based attacks
remains an active area of research.
2.2.3 Split Fabrication
2.2.3.1 Basic Idea
Split fabrication [21] is a layout-level circuit obfuscation technique. A layout
normally consists of multiple metal layers and device layers. A circuit can be obfus-
cated by splitting its layout layers into two tiers. One tier is called the untrusted tier
because it’s outsourced to an untrusted offshore foundry for advanced semiconduc-
tor technology. The other tier is called the trusted tier because it is fabricated in a
trusted foundry for security. After fabrication, two tiers are aligned and integrated
together in the trusted foundry. By having two tiers fabricated separately, the un-





Figure 2.3: Split fabrication: (a) 2D IC; (b) 3D IC; (c) 2.5D IC.
complete view of the design.
The split fabrication strategy can be applied to conventional 2D IC technology
and emerging 3D IC technologies.
• 2D IC based Split Fabrication. Fig. 2.3 (a) shows a cross-section of a 2D IC
layout, which consists of multiple metal layers and a device layer. For 2D IC
split fabrication [27, 54–57], the layout layers are divided into a Front-End-
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of-Line (FEOL) tier that contains the device layer and lower metal layers,
and a Back-End-of-Line (BEOL) tier that contains only higher metal layers.
The FEOL tier is outsourced to an untrusted foundry for advanced fabrication
technology while the fabrication of the BEOL tier and the final integration are
securely implemented in a trusted foundry. As a result, interconnect wires in
the BEOL tier are kept secret from the untrusted foundry.
• 3D IC based Split Fabrication. 3D integration is a technology that vertically
integrates multiple 2D dies to create a single high-performance chip, referred
to as 3D IC (as shown in Fig. 2.3 (b)). Split fabrication for 3D ICs can be done
in two approaches [58–60]. In one approach, some 2D dies are fabricated in a
trusted foundry as the trusted tier while others are fabricated in an untrusted
foundry as the untrusted tier, as shown in Fig. 2.3 (b). With that, a portion
of circuit design in the trusted tier are not directly accessible to the untrusted
foundry. In another approach, all 2D dies are outsourced to offshore foundries,
but they are securely aligned and integrated in a trusted foundry. By doing so,
the vertical connections between dies are kept secret. Although the offshore
foundry can reverse-engineer the layout of each die, the retrieved netlist is
incomplete because it lacks the vertical inter-die connections. Such incomplete
netlist would be incomprehensible if a circuit design is intelligently partitioned
into different dies in an obfuscated manner.
• 2.5D IC based Split Fabrication. Interposer-based 3D IC, also known as 2.5D
IC, is a special form of 3D IC. As shown in Fig. 2.3(c), 2.5D IC places multiple
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2D dies side-by-side and stacks them on a silicon interposer. The interposer
contains both horizontal chip-scale interconnect wires between dies as well as
vertical interconnect TSVs to external I/O pins. While commercial large-scale
3D IC is still being developed, the 2.5D product is already in the market, such
as Xilinx Virtex-7 2000T [61]. For 2.5D IC split fabrication [34–38, 62, 63],
the silicon interposer is fabricated in the trusted foundry as the trusted tier
while the dies are outsourced to offshore foundries as the untrusted tier. The
final integration is also implemented in the trusted foundry. Accordingly, the
interconnection in the interposer is hidden from the untrusted foundry.
2.2.3.2 Attacks on Split Fabrication
The security of split fabrication rests upon the assumption that the attacker
does not know the hidden portion (the trusted tier) and cannot infer it based on
the exposed portion of design (the untrusted tier). Otherwise, the attacker can
reconstruct the complete design and continue to pirate or overproduce it. Attacks
on 2D and 2.5D split fabrication have been proposed in recent literature [27–29,34].
To infer the hidden wires in the trusted tier, Rajendran et al. [27] proposed an
attack called proximity attack. The attack is based on the observation that modern
floorplanning and placement tool will place two connected input/output pins closely
so as to reduce the interconnect wire-length. However, the physical proximity of two
connected pins leaks the information of the hidden connections. Since the layout
information of the untrusted tier is known to the attacker, he can obtain the position
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of all input/output pins. With this, he can iteratively connect an output pin to
its closet input pin until a netlist is reconstructed. Extensions of the proximity
attack have been proposed, which exploit extra layout information such as routing
proximity [29], input/output capacitance and timing constraints [28].
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Chapter 3: Anti-SAT: Secure Logic Locking Against SAT Attack
3.1 Introduction
In Section 2.2.2, we have introduced a circuit obfuscation technique called logic
locking, which can be used to protect outsourced IC designs from being pirated or
counterfeited by untrusted foundries. Fig. 3.1 shows a simple example of logic
locking. A gate-level netlist is locked by inserting a set of key-gates and key-inputs.
The locked netlist preserves the correct functionality only when a correct key is
provided to the key-inputs. Recently, the security of logic locking is threatened by
a strong attack called SAT attack, which can decipher the correct key of most logic
locking techniques within a few hours [24] even for a reasonably large key-size. This
attack iteratively solves SAT formulas which progressively eliminate the incorrect
keys till the circuit is unlocked. In this chapter, we present a circuit block (referred
(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Logic locking: (a) original circuit; (b) locked circuit.
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to as Anti-SAT block) to enhance the security of existing logic locking techniques
against the SAT attack. We show using a mathematical proof that the number of
SAT attack iterations to reveal the correct key in a circuit comprising an Anti-SAT
block is an exponential function of the key-size thereby making the SAT attack
computationally infeasible. Besides, we address the vulnerability of the Anti-SAT
block to various removal attacks and investigate obfuscation techniques to prevent
these removal attacks. More importantly, we provide a proof showing that these
obfuscation techniques for making Anti-SAT un-removable would not weaken the
Anti-SAT block’s resistance to SAT attack. The contributions of this work are as
follows.
• We propose an Anti-SAT circuit block to mitigate the SAT attack on logic
locking. We illustrate how to construct the functionality of the Anti-SAT
block and use a mathematically rigorous approach to prove that if chosen
correctly, the Anti-SAT block makes SAT attack computationally infeasible
(exponential in key-size).
• The Anti-SAT block might be subject to attacks that intend to identify and
nullify it, which are called removal attacks. We investigate a unified obfusca-
tion technique to hide the functionality and structure of the Anti-SAT block.
Also, we provide a proof showing that the obfuscation technique would not
weaken the Anti-SAT block’s resistance to the SAT attack.
• Rigorous analysis and experiments on 6 circuits from ISCAS85 and MCNC
benchmark suites have been conducted to validate the effectiveness of our
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proposed technique in improving the security of existing logic locking tech-
niques.
3.2 Preliminary: SAT Attack
Recently, Subramanyan et al. [24] proposed a new attack called SAT attack
that can effectively break many logic locking techniques including [20,22,47,50,53].
3.2.1 Attack Model
The SAT attack is based on the same attack model as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.1. It assumes that the attacker is an untrusted foundry whose objective
is to obtain the correct key of a locked circuit and then pirate or overprudce the
unlocked IC design. The attacker has access to the following two components: 1) a
gate-level locked netlist, which can be obtained by reverse-engineering the layout file
provided by the designer and 2) an activated functional chip, which can be obtained
from an open market. The followings discuss the insight and algorithm of the SAT
attack.
3.2.2 Attack Insight
The key idea of the SAT attack is to reveal the correct key using a small number
of carefully selected inputs and their correct outputs observed from an activated
functional chip. These special input/output pairs are referred to as distinguishing
input/output (DIO) pairs. Each DIO can be used to identify a subset of wrong
31
key combinations based on circuit satisfiability checking. Together, these DIOs
guarantee that only the correct key can be consistent with these correct I/O pairs.
This implies that a key that correctly matches the inputs to the outputs for all the
DIOs must be the correct key. The crus of the SAT attack is to find this set of
DIOs by iteratively building and solving a sequence of SAT formulas (which will be
discussed later).
Definition 1 (Wrong key combination). Consider the logic function ~Y = fl( ~X, ~K)
and its SAT formula C( ~X, ~K, ~Y ) in conjunctive normal form (CNF). Let ( ~X, ~Y ) =
( ~Xi, ~Yi), where ( ~Xi, ~Yi) is a correct I/O pair. The set of key combinations WKi which
result in an incorrect output of the logic circuit (i.e., ~Yi 6= fl( ~Xi, ~K), ∀ ~K ∈ WKi)
is called the set of wrong key combinations identified by the I/O pair ( ~Xi, ~Yi). In
terms of SAT formula, it can be represented as C( ~Xi, ~K, ~Yi) = False, ∀ ~K ∈ WKi.
Definition 2 (Distinguishing input/output (DIO) pair). As noted above, the
SAT attack shall solve a set of SAT formulas iteratively. In each iteration, it shall
find a correct I/O pair to identify a subset of wrong key combinations until none of
these are left. An I/O pair at i-th iteration is a DIO, denoted as ( ~Xdi , ~Y
d
i ), if it can
identify a unique subset of wrong key combinations that cannot be identified by the
previous i− 1 DIOs, i.e., WKi * (∪j=i−1j=1 WKj), where WKi is the set of wrong key
combinations identified by the DIO at i-th iteration.
The crux of the SAT attack algorithm relies on finding the DIOs iteratively
to identify unique wrong key combinations (see Definition 2) until no further ones
can be found. At this point, the set of all DIOs together can identify all wrong key
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combinations thereby revealing the correct one. An illustration of the SAT attack
process is shown in Fig. 3.2. In each iteration, the SAT attack will find a new
DIO that can rule out a subset of wrong key combinations WKi. Notice that each
iteration can identify unique wrong key combinations that are not belong to the
ones discovered previously, i.e., WKi * (∪j=i−1j=1 WKj). The attack terminates when
all wrong key combinations are identified.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the iterative SAT attack process. Wrong key combinations
are iteratively identified by a set of DIOs till no new ones exist. WKi is the set of
wrong key combinations identified by i-th DIO.
Take the XOR/XNOR based locked circuit in Fig. 3.1 as an example. At first
iteration, the I/O pair ( ~Xd1 , ~Y
d
1 ) = (00, 10) is a distinguishing I/O pair because it can
rule out wrong key combinations ~K = (01), (10), and (11) as these key combinations
will result in incorrect outputs (y1y2) = (11), (00) and (01), respectively. Since this
single I/O observation has already ruled out all incorrect key combinations, we have
revealed the correct key ~K = (00). In general, a small number of correct I/O pairs
(compared to all possible I/O pairs) are usually enough to infer the correct key [24].
As a result, the SAT attack is efficient because it only requires a small number of
iterations to find these distinguishing I/O pairs.
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3.2.3 Attack Algorithm
As noted above, the central theme of SAT attack algorithm is to iteratively find
distinguishing I/O pairs till no new ones can be found. To find such distinguishing
I/O pairs, the SAT attack algorithm iteratively formulates a SAT formula that can
be solved by SAT solvers. The SAT formula Fi at i-th iteration is:




C( ~Xdj , ~K1, ~Y
d
j )) ∧ (
j=i−1∧
j=1




Let’s look at this SAT formula Fi line by line. Recall that C( ~X, ~K, ~Y ) is the SAT
formula of a locked circuit with PIs ~X, key-inputs ~K, and POs ~Y . Besides, ~Xdj is
the distinguishing input identified in the previous j-th iteration and ~Y dj is the corre-
sponding correct output. This correct output is know from the activated functional
chip obtained from the open market.
• The first line of Eq. (3.1) can be interpreted as a Miter-like circuit [64] as
shown in Fig. 3.3. Specifically, C( ~X, ~K1, ~Y1) can be viewed as the first copy
of the locked circuit and C( ~X, ~K2, ~Y2) is the second copy of the locked circuit,
where ~X, ~K1, ~K2, ~Y1, ~Y2 are all unknown variables. As seen, these two circuit
copies share the same PIs ~X but have different key-inputs and different POs.
The clauses (~Y1 6= ~Y2) enforce that two POs must be different in order to
satisfy this SAT formula.
• In the second line of Eq. (3.1), C( ~Xdj , ~K1, ~Y dj ) can be viewed as another copy
of the locked circuit, where its PIs are fixed to known values ~Xdj , POs are
34
Figure 3.3: Miter-like circuit for finding distinguishing inputs.
fixed to known values ~Y dj , and the key-inputs are connected to ~K1. Similarly,
C( ~Xdj , ~K2, ~Y
d
j ) can be viewed in the same way but the key-inputs are connected
to ~K2.
If Eq. (3.1) is satisfiable, an assignment for variables ~X, ~K1, ~K2, ~Y1, ~Y2 will be
generated. Let’s denote the values assigned to ~X as ~Xdi . The first line in the
formula Eq. (3.1) guarantees that the input ~X = ~Xdi is capable of identifying two
keys ~K1, ~K2 which produce different outputs (see ~Y1 6= ~Y2). In other words, at least
one of the key assignments is incorrect. This in itself is not enough to call ~X = ~Xdi as
a distinguishing input. According to Definition 2, a distinguishing input in the i-th
iteration must find unique wrong key combinations that have not been identified by
previous i− 1 DIOs. This condition is checked by the second line of Eq. (3.1). The
clauses in line 2 guarantee that the keys ~K1 and ~K2 which result in different outputs
in line 1 of this formula produce the correct outputs for all previous DIOs. Hence, in
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this iteration we could identify at least one incorrect key combination which previous
iterations could not. Therefore, by Definition 2 the input ~Xdi (obtained from the
SAT solver) and the corresponding correct output ~Y di (obtained from the activated
chip) represent the i-th DIO pair. The processing of finding DIOs is continued till
no new ones can be found (assuming after λ iterations). At this point, a correct key




C( ~Xdi , ~K, ~Y
d
i ) (3.2)
Basically it finds a key ~K which satisfies the correct functionality for all the DIOs.
This must be the correct key since no other DIOs exist at this point (see Definition 2).
The SAT attack algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. It starts by first solving
the line 1 of the SAT formula Eq. (3.1) and as iterations progress it adds the clauses
comprised in line 2 of the formula Eq. (3.1). It stops when the resulting SAT
formula is unsatisfiable indicating no further DIOs exist. The correct key is obtained
by finding a key value which satisfies the correct I/O behavior of all the DIOs
(Eq. (3.2)). This algorithm is guaranteed to find the correct key. Please refer to [24]
for any further theoretical details.
3.3 Motivation and Problem Statement
As discussed in Section 3.2, the SAT attack [24] has created a new security
concern on the logic locking technique. Note that the SAT attack is an iterative
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Algorithm 1 SAT Attack Algorithm [24]
Input: C and eval
Output: ~KC
1: i := 1;
2: Gi := True;
3: Fi := C( ~X, ~K1, ~Y1) ∧ C( ~X, ~K2, ~Y2) ∧ (~Y1 6= ~Y2);
4: while sat[Fi] do
5: ~Xdi := sat assignment ~X [Fi];
6: ~Y di := eval(
~Xdi );
7: Gi+1 := Gi ∧ C( ~Xdi , ~K, ~Y di );
8: Fi+1 := Fi ∧ C( ~Xdi , ~K1, ~Y di ) ∧ C( ~Xdi , ~K2, ~Y di );
9: i := i+ 1;
10: end while
11: ~KC := sat assignment ~K(Gi);





where λ is the total number of SAT attack iterations and ti is the SAT solving time
for i-th iteration. Consequently, the SAT attack can be mitigated if ti is large and/or
λ is large. λ depends on the key-size and key location in the locked circuit. However,
simply increasing the key-size or trying different key locations may not effectively
thwart the SAT attack. As shown in the SAT attack results [24], even with large
number of keys (50% area overhead), for six previously proposed key-gate insertion
algorithms [20, 22, 47, 50, 53], 86% benchmarks on average can still be unlocked in
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10 hours.
This serious security threat motivates us to investigate a SAT attack resistant
logic locking design. We want to develop a light-weight SAT-attack resistant circuit
block (denoted as the Anti-SAT block) to enhance the security of conventional logic
locking against the SAT attack. The Anti-SAT block will be integrated into the
original circuit to thwart the SAT attack. The objective is to construct the Anti-
SAT block and use a mathematically rigorous approach to prove that if chosen
correctly, the Anti-SAT block makes the SAT attack iterations grow exponentially
in key-size, thereby making SAT attack computationally infeasible. Besides, to
prevent the Anti-SAT block from being identified (and removed by an attacker), we
shall develop obfuscation techniques to hide the functionality and structure of the
Anti-SAT block.
3.4 Anti-SAT Based Logic Locking
To mitigate the SAT attack, we propose to insert a relatively light-weight
circuit block (referred to as Anti-SAT block) that can efficiently increase the number
of iterations λ so as to increase the total execution time T .
3.4.1 Anti-SAT Configurations
Fig. 3.4(a) and Fig. 3.4(b) illustrate two configurations of the proposed Anti-
SAT block, referred to as type-0 Anti-SAT and type-1 Anti-SAT. They consist
of two logic blocks g and g, which share the same set of inputs ~X = (X1...Xn).
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Figure 3.4: Anti-SAT block configuration: (a) type-0 Anti-SAT: always outputs 0
if key values are correct; (b) type-1 Anti-SAT: always outputs 1 if key values are
correct; (c) integrating the Type-0 Anti-SAT block into a circuit.
The functionalities of g and g are complementary. A set of key-gates (XORs 1)
are inserted at the inputs of two logic blocks, denoted as ~Kl1 = (K1...Kn) and
~Kl2 = (Kn+1...K2n). Hence the key-size is 2n. The output of g and g are fed into
an AND2 gate (for Fig. 3.4(a)) or an OR2 gate (for Fig. 3.4(b)) to form the final
single-bit output Y . As a result, we have Y = g( ~X ⊕ ~Kl1) ∧ g( ~X ⊕ ~Kl2) for type-0
1Note that here we are using only XOR gates as key-gates for the sake of ease of explanation.
The key-gates used could be either XOR or XNOR gates (+ inverters) based on a user-defined
key [47]. The usage of inverters can remove the association between key-gate types and key-values
(e.g., the correct key into an XOR gate can be either 0 or 1). Besides, the synthesis tools can
“bubble push” the inverters to their fan-out gates and an attacker cannot easily identify which
inverters are part of the key-gates [47]. Therefore, the attacker cannot obtain the correct key-values
by simply inspecting the key-gate types.
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Anti-SAT and Y = g( ~X ⊕ ~Kl1) ∨ g( ~X ⊕ ~Kl2) for type-1 Anti-SAT.
Constant-output Property: One basic property of Anti-SAT block is that
when the key vector is correctly set, the output Y is a constant. Specifically, given a
correct key, Y always outputs value 0 for type-0 Anti-SAT (Fig. 3.4(a)) and always
outputs value 1 for type-1 Anti-SAT (Fig. 3.4(b)). On the other hand, when a wrong
key is given, Y can output either 1 or 0 depending on the inputs ~X. This property
enables it to be integrated into the original circuit. Fig. 3.4(c) shows an example of
integrating a type-0 Anti-SAT into a circuit. As seen, the inputs of Anti-SAT block
~X are from the wires in the original circuit. The output Y is connected into the
original circuit using an XOR gate. When a correct key is provided, the output Y
always equals to 0 (so the XOR gate behaves as a buffer) and thus will not affect
the functionality of the original circuit. If a wrong key is provided, Y can be 1 for
some inputs (so the XOR gate behaves as an inverter) and thus can produce a fault
in the original circuit. Similarly, the type-1 Anti-SAT block can be integrated into
the original circuit using an XNOR gate.
Correct Keys: Since the Anti-SAT block has 2n keys, the total number of
wrong key combinations is 22n−c, assuming there exists c correct key combinations.
To ensure the constant-output property, the correct keys for the Anti-SAT block
would be the ones that make type-0 Anti-SAT always output 0 and type-1 Anti-
SAT always output 1. We can design g such that this happens when i-th key-bit
from ~Kl1 and i-th key-bit from ~Kl2 have the same value. So the number of correct
key combinations c = 2n for both types of Anti-SAT blocks and the number of wrong
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key combinations is 22n − 2n.
In the subsequent sections, we provide details on constructing the Anti-SAT
block (i.e., the functionality of g) and its impact on SAT attack complexity. We
provide a rigorous mathematical analysis which gives a provable lower bound to the
number of SAT attack iterations. For some constructions of g, this lower bound is
exponential in the key-size thereby making the SAT-attack complexity very high.
3.4.2 SAT Attack Resistance Analysis
Here we analyze the complexity of SAT attack on the Anti-SAT block (assum-
ing this is the circuit being attacked to decipher the 2n key bits).
Terminology Given a Boolean function g(~L) with n inputs, assuming there exists
p input vectors that make g equal to one (denote p as on-set size, 1 ≤ p ≤ 2n − 1),
we can classify the input vectors ~L into two groups LT and LF , where one group
makes g = 1 and another makes g = 0:
LT = {~L|g(~L) = 1}, (|LT | = p)
LF = {~L|g(~L) = 0}, (|LF | = 2n − p)
(3.4)
The function g and its complementary function g are used to construct the Anti-SAT
block as shown in Fig. 3.4.
Theorem 3.4.1. Assuming the on-set size p of function g is sufficiently close to 1
or sufficiently close to 2n− 1, the number of iterations needed by the SAT attack to
decipher the correct key is lower bounded by 2n.
Proof for Type-0 Anti-SAT. As shown in Section 3.2, the SAT attack algorithm will
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iteratively find a DIO ( ~Xdi , Y
d
i ) to identify wrong key combinations in the Anti-
SAT block until all wrong key combinations are identified. In the i-th iteration,
the corresponding DIO can identify a subset of wrong key combinations, denoted as
WKi. Notice that for any input combinations (including the distinguishing inputs
~Xdi ), the correct output (when provided the correct key) is 0 for type-0 Anti-SAT.
Therefore, a wrong key combination ~K = ( ~Kl1, ~Kl2) ∈ WKi which was identified by
( ~Xdi , Y
d
i ) must produce the Anti-SAT block output incorrectly as 1. This condition
is described below.
Y di = g( ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl1) ∧ g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) = 1
⇔ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1) = 1) ∧ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) = 0)
⇔ (( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1) ∈ LT ) ∧ (( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) ∈ LF )
(3.5)
Basically Eq. (3.5) states that the wrong key identified in the i-th iteration
must be such that its output Y di should be 1. This implies that both g and g must
evaluate to 1. This means that the input to g, which is ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1, should be in LT
and the input to g, which is ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2, should be in LF .
Since ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 is the input vector to g, for any given ~Xdi , we can always find
a key ~Kl1 such that ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LT . Basically ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 flips some of the bits of
~Xdi (for which corresponding ~Kl1 bits are 1) while keeping other bits the same (for
which corresponding ~Kl1 bits are 0). Hence for a given ~X
d
i , we can always choose
~Kl1 such that the resulting input to g is in L
T . However note that |LT | = p in
Eq. (3.4). Hence for any given ~Xdi , we can select ~Kl1 in p different ways such that
~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LT .
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Similarly, for any given ~Xdi , we can always find a key ~Kl2 such that ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈
LF . Note that |LF | = 2n − p in Eq. (3.4). Hence for any given ~Xdi , we can select
~Kl2 in 2
n − p different ways such that ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LF .
Now, as noted above, for a given ~Xdi , a wrong key ~K = ( ~Kl1, ~Kl2) should be
such that ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LT and ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LF . The total number of ways in which
we can select such a wrong key is p · (2n − p).
Now in any given iteration i, for a given Xdi , the maximum number of incorrect
keys identified is p · (2n− p). This follows naturally from the discussion above. This
is the maximum number because it is very much possible that some of these keys
were identified in previous iterations. Hence the total number of unique wrong keys
UKi identified in iteration i is upper-bounded by p · (2n − p). This is noted in the
equation below.
p · (2n − p) ≥ UKi (3.6)
The SAT attack works by iteratively removing all incorrect keys till only the correct
ones are left (assuming after λ iterations). Hence the following holds true.
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Proof for Type-1 Anti-SAT. For type-1 Anti-SAT, the correct output (when provided
the correct key) is always 1. Therefore, a wrong key combination ~K = ( ~Kl1, ~Kl2) ∈




i ) must produce the incorrect output as 0. This
condition is described below.
Y di = g( ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl1) ∨ g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) = 0.
⇔ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1) = 0) ∧ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) = 1)
⇔ (( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1) ∈ LF ) ∧ (( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) ∈ LT )
(3.10)
Based on the discussion in the proof for type-0 Anti-SAT, we know that for any
given ~Xdi , we can select ~Kl1 in 2
n− p different ways such that ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LF . Also,
for any given ~Xdi , we can select ~Kl2 in p different ways such that ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LT .
As noted in Eq. (3.10), for a given ~Xdi , a wrong key ~K = ( ~Kl1, ~Kl2) should be such
that ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LF and ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LT . The total number of ways in which we
can select such a wrong key is p · (2n − p), which is exactly the same as the one
for type-0 Anti-SAT. Therefore, the subsequent analysis would be the same as the
analysis for type-0 Anti-SAT and we can obtain the same lower bound λ0 as shown
in Eq. (3.9). Hence proved.

As seen in Eq. (3.9), if we choose a g function such that p is either very low
or very high then the SAT attack would at least require an exponential number of
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Anti-SAT block design and obfuscation: (a) one possible construction
of function g to ensure large number of SAT attack iterations; (b) an additional
key-gate is inserted for functional obfuscation.
iterations in n. Since the key-size of Anti-SAT is 2n, the number of SAT attack
iterations is also an exponential number in the key-size of Anit-SAT when g is
correctly configured. One possible choice of g is indicated in Fig. 3.5(a) where g is
chosen to be a simple n-input AND gate. For AND gates p = 1 which clearly results
in exponential complexity of SAT attack in n. Experimental results to indicate that
shall be shown later. Moreover, we can see that the lower bound λ0 is tight when
p = 1 or p = 2n − 1. This is because that for a n-input Anti-SAT block, the total
number of input combinations is 2n so the number of iterations to find distinguishing
inputs is upper-bounded, i.e., λ ≤ 2n. This combined with the Eq. (3.9) shows that
the lower bound is tight when p = 1 or p = 2n − 1.
3.4.3 Integrating Anti-SAT into a Circuit
When the Anti-SAT block is integrated into a circuit, a set of wires in the
original circuit are connected to the inputs ~X of the Anti-SAT block and the output
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Y of the Anti-SAT block is integrated to a wire in the original circuit (as shown
in Fig. 3.4(c)). If ~X are connected to wires that are highly correlated (e.g., two
wires with identical logic), then the overall security of the block shall be reduced
because less possible input combinations can occur at the inputs of the Anti-SAT
block. The location for Y is also important. An incorrect key causes Y = 1 for
some inputs (for type-0 Anti-SAT). This incorrect Anti-SAT output must impact
the overall functionality of the original circuit. Otherwise the logic will continue to
function correctly despite of wrong key inputs. In conclusion, the best location of
the Anti-SAT block is such that the inputs ~X are highly independent and Y has
high observability at the POs (i.e., changes in Y can be observed by the POs of
the original circuit). Here we propose a secure integration method: n inputs of the
Anti-SAT block ~X are connected to n PIs of the original circuit. The output Y is
connected to a wire which is randomly selected from wires that have the top 30%
observability. The randomness of the location of Y can assist in hiding the output
wire of the Anti-SAT block and preventing it from being identified and nullified.
The impact of the Anti-SAT integration location on the overall security shall be
evaluated in the experiments.
3.4.4 A Combined Locking Approach
As noted before, conventional logic locking techniques such as [22, 47] try
to avoid an unauthorized user who does not have a key from accessing the chip’s
functionality. They attempt to insert key gates in a way to achieve high output-
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corruptibility, i.e., forcing the chip to deviate substantially from the actual function-
ality whenever a wrong key is provided. These techniques are not immune to SAT
attack (as noted in [24] and also indicated in our simulations). While our Anti-SAT
block can provide provable measures to increasing the SAT attack complexity, they
may not necessarily cause substantial deviation in the chip functionality for incor-
rect keys. Hence an unauthorized end user may still be able to use the chip correctly
for “many” inputs (but not all). Therefore, conventional logic locking techniques
need to be combined with our Anti-SAT block designs for achieving foolproof logic
locking. Moreover, the key-gates inserted at the original circuit can make the Anti-
SAT block less distinguishable with the original circuit. Without these key-gates in
the original circuit, an attacker has less difficulty to locate the Anti-SAT block by
inspecting the only key-inputs into the Anti-SAT block.
In this work, the original circuit is locked using the secure logic locking (SLL),
an interference-based logic locking algorithm [22]. This technique has been shown to
be secure against key-sensitizing attack [22] (see Section 2.2.2.2) while obfuscating
the original functionality.
3.5 Anti-SAT Block Obfuscation
In this section, we first analyze the security of Anti-SAT against a new type of
attack called removal attack, which aims at identifying and nullifying the Anti-SAT
block. Then, we investigate a unified obfuscation based on [51] which hides the
functional and structural traces of the Anti-SAT block.
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3.5.1 Removal Attacks on Anti-SAT
3.5.1.1 Functional Attributes
In Anti-SAT, the logic blocks g and g have complementary functionality. An
attacker can simulate the circuit and find potential complementary pairs of signals
leading to potential identification of the Anti-SAT block. Moreover, in order to
guarantee exponential number of SAT attack iterations, the function g shall be con-
figured to have very small on-set size p. Assuming p = 1, the outputs of g/g would
be 0/1 for most of the time even when wrong keys are provided for the Anti-SAT
block. In other words, the outputs of g and g will have very high signal skews of
opposite polarities. This functional attribute is exploited by Signal Probability Skew
(SPS) attack [65] to identify the Anti-SAT block. Another functionality attribute
of Anti-SAT block is its low functionality corruptibility. Due to the construction
of g and g, the Anti-SAT keys normally have lower output corruptibility than the
conventional keys in the original circuit. Recently, an approximate de-obfuscation
technique called AppSAT [41] was proposed to learn the high-corruptibility con-
ventional keys in the original circuit. An AppSAT + netlist analysis based removal
attack [66] has also been proposed to identify the Anti-SAT block.
3.5.1.2 Structural Attributes
In the Anti-SAT block, the internal wires in g and g do not have connections
with the locked circuit. This makes the Anti-SAT block a relatively isolated and
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.6: Design withholding and entanglement technique [51]: (a) original circuit;
(b) design withholding and (c) wire entanglement.
separable structure. When the size of the Anti-SAT block is roughly known, it’s
possible for an attacker to utilize a partitioning algorithm to partition the whole
circuit into two parts while ensuring that small partition has about the same size as
the Anti-SAT block. If a large portion of gates of the Anti-SAT block is moved to the
small partition, then the attacker will have less difficulty to identify the Anti-SAT
block using this partitioning based removal attack.
3.5.2 Mitigating Removal Attacks
To mitigate the removal attacks, we propose a unified obfuscation technique
that obfuscates the functionality and structural attributes of the Anti-SAT block us-
ing design withholding and wire entanglement [51]. Fig. 3.6 illustrate the basic idea
of design withholding and wire entanglement. In design withholding (Fig. 3.6(a)), a
portion of design is replaced with a set of LUT’s to ensure that the original design
detail is not available to the untrusted foundry. Hence, design withholding technique
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Figure 3.7: Anti-SAT obfuscation based on design withholding and wire entangle-
ment.
can be used to hide both the functionality and implementation detail of the Anti-
SAT. Design entanglement is another obfuscation technique that aims at obfuscating
the interconnect structure of an IC design by using a wire-entanglement module, as
shown in Fig. 3.6(b). The basic idea of wire-entanglement module is to entangle
a set of target wires with another set of obfuscation wires using MUX-based inter-
connect network. When the selection bits of the MUXes are correctly configured,
the wire-entanglement module will represent the original interconnection. The wire-
entanglement module is useful for obfuscating the interconnect structure between
the Anti-SAT block and the original netlist.
Fig. 3.7 illustrates the overall obfuscation for Anti-SAT based on design with-
holding and wire entanglement. The design withholding technique is used to hide
the functionality of the Anti-SAT block and part of the original netlist. When ob-
fuscated using LUTs, the signal skews of g and g would be significantly reduced,
so the SPS attack cannot effectively identify the Anti-SAT block. Note that the
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obfuscation for g and g does not necessarily need to be balanced (i.e., the key-size
of g and g can be different) as long as the outputs of g and g do not have a high
signal skew. This can help mitigating the AppSAT + netlist analysis attack which
assumes both g and g would have roughly the same key-size and use it as a hint to
locate the Anti-SAT.
On the other hand, wire-entanglement technique is used to obfuscate the in-
terconnection between the original circuit and the Anti-SAT block to prevent the
partitioning-based attack. With the wire-entanglement module, the interconnec-
tions between the Anti-SAT block and the locked circuit will be increased and it’s
difficult for an attacker to partition and isolate the Anti-SAT block from the locked
circuit. Besides, the design withholding and entanglement technique can be de-
signed to mitigate the AppSAT + netlist analysis attack. This is because that
after wire entanglement, new signal paths would be created which fanout many low-
corruptibility keys to the original netlist. Therefore, gates in the original netlist can
have many low-corruptibility keys in their fan-in cones. It increases the difficulty
of the netlist analysis phase which tries to identify the Anti-SAT by counting the
number of low-corruptibility keys in a gate’s fan-in.
With regard to SAT attack, since these techniques are based on LUT-based
and MUX-based logic locking, they can be modeled in SAT formula and attacked
by the SAT attack. However, in Section 3.5.3, we will use a proof to show that the
number of SAT attack iterations for unlocking a circuit with an obfuscated Anti-
SAT will not be reduced. Experimental results in Section 3.6.3 also validate this
analysis.
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3.5.3 SAT-attack Resistance of Anti-SAT After Obfuscation
In Section 3.5.2, a unified obfuscation technique for Anti-SAT block based on
withholding and entanglement [51] is discussed. It basically obfuscates the Anti-
SAT block by adding additional logic gates and key-inputs. Here we use a rigorous
proof to show that the resistance of Anti-SAT block would not be weakened when
obfuscation technique is applied. In other words, adding addition key-gates and
key-inputs will not reduce the number of SAT attack iterations required to decipher
the Anti-SAT block.
We first show that adding one additional key-gate for obfuscation will not
reduce the number of SAT attack iterations required for unlocking the Anti-SAT.
Without loss of generality, we use XOR/XNOR-based key-gates instead of LUT-
based key-gates to obfuscate the Anti-SAT in order to simply the proof. Also, we
insert the extra key-gate as shown in Fig. 3.5(b).
Theorem 3.5.1. Assuming a new key-gate K2n+1 is inserted into the Anti-SAT
block (with p = 1) for obfuscation (as shown in Fig. 3.5(b)), the number of SAT
attack iterations needed by the SAT attack to decipher the correct key will remain
to be 2n.
Proof: Let’s first derive the equation which represents the wrong key combinations
that can be identified by a DIO ( ~Xdi , ~Y
d
i ). Notice that for any input combinations
(including the distinguishing inputs ~Xdi ), the correct output (when provided a cor-
rect key) is 0 for type-0 Anti-SAT. Therefore, a wrong key combination which is
identified by ( ~Xdi , ~Y
d
i ) must result in incorrect output as 1. This condition is de-
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scribed as
[(K2n+1 = 0) ∧ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1) = 1) ∧ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) = 1)]
∨[(K2n+1 = 1) ∧ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1) = 0) ∧ (g( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2) = 1)]
(3.11)
This is equivalent to
[(K2n+1 = 0) ∧ ( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LT ) ∧ ( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LF )]
∨[(K2n+1 = 1) ∧ ( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LF ) ∧ ( ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LF )]
(3.12)
Note that the function g in Fig. 3.5(b) is an n-input AND gate,
LT = {(11...11)}, LF = Bn \ LT (3.13)
where Bn is the set of all n-bit boolean vectors, and Bn \ LT means every n-bit
Boolean vector except (11...11).
We can see that when K2n+1 = 0, to satisfy Eq. (3.12), we need to ensure
~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl1 ∈ LT and ~Xdi ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LF . Since LT has only one vector (11...11), for any
~Xdi , we only have one way of selecting ~Kl1 to make ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl1 = (11...11), that is
~Kl1 = ¬ ~Xdi (bit-wise negation), i.e.,
~Kl1[j] = ¬ ~Xdi [j], j = 1...n (3.14)
On the other hand, since LF = Bn \ LT , for any ~Xdi , we have 2n − 1 ways to select
~Kl2 such that ~X
d
i ⊕ ~Kl2 ∈ LF , those are ~Kl2 ∈ Bn \ ¬ ~Xdi .





has the following form:
( ~Kl1 = ¬ ~Xdi , ~Kl2 ∈ (Bn \ ¬ ~Xdi ), K2n+1 = 0) (3.15)
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We can see that since ~Kl1 = ¬ ~Xdi , there exists an one-to-one matching between
each pair of ~Xdi and ~Kl1. In other words, any ~X
d
i value (from 0 to 2
n − 1) can
identify a unique set of wrong key combinations in a form of Eq. (3.15). It’s unique
because that ~Kl1 = ¬ ~Xdi and different ~Xdi would result in different ~Kl1. Therefore,
every input combination (from 0 to 2n − 1) is a distinguishing input because it can
identify a unique set of wrong key combinations that can only be identified by it.
Thus, the SAT attack requires 2n DIOs (i.e., 2n iterations) to identify all wrong key
combinations.

We now show that adding more than one additional key-gates for obfuscation
still does not reduce the number of SAT attack iterations required for unlocking the
Anti-SAT.
Theorem 3.5.2. Assuming nobf new key-gates are inserted into the Anti-SAT block
(with p = 1) for obfuscation, the number of SAT attack iterations needed by the
SAT attack to decipher the correct key will be 2n.
Proof: The proof for Theorem 2 shows that after adding a new key-gate to the
Anti-SAT block for obfuscation (Fig. 3.5(b)), the number of SAT attack iterations
remains to be 2n. Notice that this conclusion is also true when nobf additional key-
gates are inserted to the Anti-SAT for obfuscation. Let’s denote the extra keys for
obfuscation as ~Kobf and its correct key is ~K
C
obf . Based on Eq. (3.15), we can conclude
that any Anti-SAT input combination is a distinguishing input ~Xdi because it can
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identify a unique set of wrong keys which is:
( ~Kl1 = ¬ ~Xdi , ~Kl2 ∈ (Bn \ ¬ ~Xdi ), ~Kobf = ~KCobf ) (3.16)
and this set of wrong keys can only be identified by this input ~Xdi . Hence the
SAT attack requires at least 2n DIOs (i.e., 2n iterations) to identify all wrong
key combinations. Therefore, adding additional key-gates at different locations for
obfuscation will not weaken the Anti-SAT’s resistance to the SAT attack.

3.6 Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate the security level of our proposed Anti-SAT blocks.
The security level is evaluated by the number of SAT attack iterations as well as
the execution time to infer the correct key. SAT attack tools and benchmarks used
are from [24]. The SAT attack tool uses the Lingeling [67] SAT solver. The CPU
time limit is set to 10 hours as [24]. The experiments are running on an Intel Core
i5-2400 CPU with 16GB RAM.
3.6.1 Anti-SAT Block Design
3.6.1.1 On-set Size p
Table 3.1 illustrates the impact of p on the security level of 16-bit Anti-SAT
blocks (type-0 and type-1). For both types of Anti-SAT, when p → 1 and p →
216 − 1 = 65535, the SAT attack algorithm fails to unlock the Anti-SAT block in
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Table 3.1: Impact of p on the security level of Anti-SAT (When n = 16).
p 1 81 243 2187 30375 63349 65293 65455 65535
Type-0 # Iterations - 10675 4760 901 273 898 4647 - -
Anti-SAT Time (s) timeout 16555.8 8746.12 174.743 3.24 307.104 12932.3 timeout timeout
Type-1 # Iterations - - 4853 877 285 881 4691 - -
Anti-SAT Time (s) timeout timeout 3559.96 55.108 3.148 187.896 1048.19 timeout timeout
10 hours. This is because that it requires a large number of iterations to rule out
all the incorrect key combinations. As p → 216/2 (the worst case), the SAT attack
begins to succeed using less and less iterations and execution time for both types
of Anti-SAT. This result validates out analysis in Eq. (3.9), which shows that for a
fixed n, when p is close to 1 or 2n − 1, λ will be large and the SAT attack will fail
within a practical time limit.
3.6.1.2 Input-size n
As shown in Eq. (3.9), λ0 is an exponential function of n when p is very low
(p → 1) or very high (p → 2n − 1). Table 3.2 shows the exponential relationship
between λ and n when p = 1 for type-0 and type-1 Anti-SAT block. It can be
seen that as n increases, the simulated SAT iterations and execution time grows
exponentially.
In the following experiments, we focus on the type-0 Anti-SAT and construct
an n-bit baseline Anti-SAT block (n-bit BA) using an n-input AND gate (p = 1) as
the logic block g to ensure large number of iterations. However notice that this is
not the only possible choice for g.
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Table 3.2: Impact of n on the security level of Anti-SAT (When p = 1).
n 8 10 12 14 16
Type-0 # Iterations 255 1023 4095 16383 -
Anti-SAT Time (s) 1.14569 20.024 324.727 4498.03 timout
Type-1 # Iterations 255 1023 4095 16383 -
Anti-SAT Time (s) 1.06 14.612 273.1 3658.76 timeout
Table 3.3: Comparison between secure and random integration.
n 8 12 16
Random
Avg. # Iteration 151 1748 11461
Avg. Time (s) 1.4296 162.529 10272.4
Secure
# Iteration 255 4095 -
Time (s) 3.452 759.924 timeout
3.6.1.3 Secure Integration of Anti-SAT
Here we compare two approaches of integrating the Anti-SAT block with the
original circuit, namely secure integration and random integration. For the secure
integration, n inputs of the Anti-SAT block ~X are connected to n PIs of the original
circuit. The output Y is connected to a wire which is randomly selected from wires
that have the top 30% observability. For the random integration, the inputs ~X are
connected to random wires of the original circuit, and the output Y is connected
to a random wire. For both cases, the wire for Y has a later topological order
than that of the wires for ~X to prevent combinational loop. Table 3.3 shows the
results for two integration approaches when three n-bit BA (n = 8, 12, 16, p = 1)
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Table 3.4: Benchmark information of 6 circuits from ISCAS85 and MCNC.
Circuit #PI #PO #Gates
Key-size
SLL n-bit BA
c1355 41 32 546 29
2n
c1908 33 25 880 46
c3540 50 22 1669 86
dalu 75 16 2298 119
des 256 245 6473 336
i8 133 81 2464 130
are integrated into the c1355 circuit from ISCAS85. It can be seen that secure
integration is better than random integration as the former requires more iterations
(∼ 2×) and execution time (∼ 3×) for the SAT attack algorithm to reveal the key.
Therefore, in the following experiments, we adopt the secure integration as the way
to integrate the Anti-SAT block into a circuit.
3.6.2 Anti-SAT Block Application
We evaluate the security level of the Anti-SAT block when it’s applied to 6
circuits from ISCAS85 and MCNC benchmark suites. The benchmark information
is shown in Table 3.4. We compare two logic locking configurations as follows:
• SLL: The original circuit is locked only using the secure logic locking (SLL),
an interference-based logic locking algorithm [22]. This technique has been
shown to be secure against key-sensitizing attack [22] while obfuscating the
original functionality.
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• SLL (5%) + n-bit BA: The original circuit is locked with SLL technique.
The number of key-gates inserted in the original circuit equals to 5% of the
gate-size of the original circuit. Besides, an n-bit BA is integrated into the
locked circuit using the secure integration (described in Section 3.4.3).
We compare the security level of two configurations when the same number of keys
are used in each configuration 2. The SAT attack results of two configurations w.r.t
increasing key-size are shown in Fig. 3.8. It can be seen that for SLL, increasing
the key-size cannot effectively increase SAT attack complexity. For all benchmarks
locked with SLL, they can be easily unlocked using at most 67 iterations and 1070.85
seconds. On the other hand, when the Anti-SAT blocks are integrated, the SAT
attack complexity increases exponentially with the key-size in the Anti-SAT block.
The SAT attack fails to unlock the circuits within 10 hours when a 16-bit BA is
integrated (as shown by the fifth data point w.r.t. x-axis).
3.6.3 Anti-SAT Block Obfuscation
In Section 3.5.3, we have shown that after obfuscation, the security of Anti-
SAT against SAT attack would not be undermined. To validate this proof, we
obfuscate the Anti-SAT block using LUTs and MUXes. Fig. 3.9 shows the SAT
2For SLL, the extra key-gates are inserted to the original circuit. For SLL(5%) + n-bit BA/OA,
the extra key-gates are used in the Anti-SAT block and increasing the key-size also indicates
increasing the input-size n because we construct the n-bit BA with key-size kBA = 2n. In this
experiment, we experiment the n-bit BA with n = 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20. The key-sizes are shown
in Table 3.4.
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Figure 3.8: SAT attack results on 6 benchmarks with three logic locking configura-
tions: SLL and SLL(5%) + n-bit BA. Timeout is 10 hours (3.6×104 s). The dashed
lines are the curve fitting results when the SAT attack has time-outed after certain
key-size.
attack results of c1355 circuit when obfuscation techniques are applied. Fig. 3.9(a)
shows the result for LUT based design withholding technique. Here we increasingly
replace the 2-input AND gates in g and g with LUTs and evaluate its impact on
the SAT attack iteration. As seen, when the number of LUTs is increased, the
SAT attack iteration remains to be 2n, where n is the input-size of Anti-SAT (n =
8, 10, 12). Fig. 3.9(b) shows the results for MUX based wire entanglement technique.
Here we use 2-input MUXes, where one input of MUX comes from the original
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.9: SAT attack results of c1355 circuit when obfuscation techniques are
applied: (a) design withholding and (b) wire entanglement. For both techniques,
the number of SAT attack iterations required are ≥ 2n after obfuscation, where n is
the input-size of Anti-SAT.
circuit and the other input comes from the Anti-SAT block. As seen, the SAT
attack iteration is ≥ 2n for different choices of n. The number of iterations could be
larger than 2n because the MUXes enlarge the fan-in cones of the Anti-SAT block.
These results confirm that the proposed obfuscation technique will not hamper the
SAT attack resistance of Anti-SAT.
3.6.4 Performance Overhead
Different implementation of g and g will result in different overhead. In our
experiments, we utilize an n-bit AND gate and an n-bit NAND gate to implement
the function g and g, each consists of n − 1 AND2 gates. The estimated area
for a n-bit BA is 4n additional gates. Since the number of SAT attack iteration
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required is 2n, a slight increase in area overhead of the Anti-SAT block can result
in exponential increase in SAT attack complexity. To counter removal attacks,
we investigate both the design withholding and entanglement techniques. These
two obfuscation techniques will inevitably increase the performance overhead. For
example, an n-input, m-output LUT would require O(m × 2n) gates. The key-size
for such LUT is m × 2n. An n-input, m-output wire entanglement module would
require m number of n-input MUXes. The key-size for such module is m× log(n).
To reduce overhead, we can use multiple small LUTs/MUXes (with less inputs and
outputs) to form large LUTs/MUXes, as suggested in [51]. However, we present it
as the first unified obfuscation technique to make various removal attacks harder.
A more light-weight solution may be explored in future research.
3.7 Related Work
3.7.1 SAT-attack Resilient Logic Locking
Recent years have seen an increasing number of research work on mitigating
the SAT attack on logic locking. In [68], Yasin et al. proposed to add an AES circuit
into a locked circuit which aims at increasing the SAT solving time. Although this
approach is effective, the AES circuit leads to a significant performance and area
overhead since a standard AES circuit implementation requires a large number of
gates [69]. In [70], a technique called SARLock was proposed which can make the
number of SAT attack iterations grow exponentially in key-size. SARLock is similar
to Anti-SAT, however, it has been shown to be vulnerable to some variants of SAT
62
attack called double-DIP [42] or bypass attack [71]. On the contrary, these attacks
cannot break Anti-SAT (when the combination of SLL and Anti-SAT locking is
used), as analyzed in [42]. In [71], Xu et al. proposed a Binary Decision Diagram
(BDD) based design technique to achieve exponential number of SAT attack itera-
tions. However, the disadvantage of the BDD based technique is that it will result
in a very significant area overhead, because the size of the BDD is almost always
exponential in the key-size as shown in [71]. To increase the difficulty of SAT formu-
lation, Shamsi [72] et al. proposed a cyclic logic locking technique which introduces
non-reducible combinational loops to the locked circuit. However, the cyclic logic
locking technique was shown vulnerable to a variant of SAT attack called Cyclic-
SAT [43]. Besides conventional logic locking, a new set of locking techniques called
parametric locking is proposed [33, 73]. The parametric locking techniques aim at
obfuscating the parametric behavior of the circuit such as power, delay and relia-
bility etc. For incorrect keys, the locked circuit will malfunction or have degraded
performance.
3.7.2 SAT Attack on IC Camouflaging
IC camouflaging is a reverse-engineering prevention technique that hides a
circuit’s functionality with camouflaging cells. It has been shown that SAT attack
can also be applied to recover the functionality of the camouflaging cells [74, 75].
To counter the SAT attack, various countermeasures have been proposed [76, 77],




In this chapter, we present a circuit block called Anti-SAT to mitigate the SAT
attack on logic locking. We show that the iterations required by the SAT attack
to reveal the correct key in the Anti-SAT block is an exponential function of the
key-size in the Anti-SAT block. The Anti-SAT block is integrated to a locked circuit
to increase its resistance to the SAT attack. A unified obfuscation technique has
been proposed to protect the Anti-SAT block from removal attacks such as the SPS
attack and the partitioning based attack. Overall, our proposed Anti-SAT based
logic locking can effectively thwart the SAT attack and various removal attacks.
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Chapter 4: Strong Anti-SAT: Secure Logic Locking for Neural Net-
work Chips
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, neural network has made a significant impact on various fields
such as computer vision, speech recognition, and natural language processing. As
neural network models (neural models) are getting deeper and more complex, its
computation is becoming time-consuming and resource-intensive. To address these
problems, researchers have started to develop fast and low-power neural network
chips that can support a range of neural models. Examples of such neural chips
include DianNao [78], EIE [79], Eyeriss [80], TPU [81], etc.
Neural chips, following the trend of fabrication outsourcing, are inevitably
subject to supply chain attacks by untrusted foundries. Logic locking techniques, as
discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, can be applied to protect the neural network
chip design from being pirated or overproduced. However, locking neural chips is not
the same as locking conventional chips in two aspects. Firstly, most neural network
applications are inherently error-tolerant. The classification accuracy of a neural
network would be acceptable even when some of its underlying computations are in-
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correct [82]. This can be exploited by an attacker who can just find an approximate
key (approx-key) instead of a correct key to approximately unlock the chip such that
it can output correctly for most inputs. The relaxed requirement makes attacks such
as Approximate SAT (AppSAT) attack [41] applicable. Secondly, most neural mod-
els are tune-able (e.g., by fine-tuning the weight values). An attacker can adjust his
own neural models to accommodate the approximately-unlocked (approx-unlocked)
neural chips, hence further improving the classification accuracy.
In this work, we address these new challenges and propose a novel locking
technique to protect neural chips against untrusted foundries. The neural chip
can be loaded with a wide range of neural models. The objective of locking the
neural chip is to ensure that given any wrong key, the locked neural chip cannot
function correctly, so any neural model running on such chip would have very low
classification accuracy. Neural chips are normally composed of a control unit, an
arithmetic unit, a memory interface and an interconnect unit. These components
can be locked to protect the neural chips. For simplicity, we target the locking of
the arithmetic unit (i.e., adders and multipliers) in this work. However, some of
our proposed techniques can be extended and applied to other components. The
contributions of this work are as follows.
• We propose an attack methodology to investigate the vulnerability of state-
of-the-art logic locking techniques [31] in securing neural chips. The proposed
attack firstly utilizes the AppSAT attack [41] to find an approx-key which
results in neural chips with very low error rate. Deploying neural models on
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such hardware is shown to have only 7.2% reduction in classification accuracy.
To further improve accuracy, we propose a neural-network fine-tuning tech-
nique which exploits the error characteristics of the approx-unlocked neural
chips. Experiment results show that after fine-tuning, the accuracy loss for
the deployed neural model is 0%.
• To counter this attack, we propose a secure locking scheme for neural chips
which is based on a co-design of locking infrastructure and functional modules.
We first propose an improved locking infrastructure (called Strong Anti-SAT
block) based on Anti-SAT. We use a rigorous proof to derive a lower-bound
of error rate for the Strong Anti-SAT block. Note that this error rate lower-
bound holds for any wrong key. Thus, with correct configuration of Strong
Anti-SAT, we can guarantee a high error rate for any key that’s obtained by
the AppSAT attack [41], hence making the attack ineffective. Furthermore,
we investigate functional modules (e.g., multipliers) which can be designed to
be very hard for SAT solving. Hence, by appropriate design of the functional
modules, we can ensure extremely long time for exact SAT attack [24] to find a
correct key, thereby making it computationally impractical to correctly unlock
the neural chips.
• Experimental results show that the proposed locking scheme can result in 1)
80% accuracy loss for neural models deployed on any approx-unlocked chip,




4.2.1 Neural Network Models
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Neural networks: (a) multi-layer perceptron; (b) convolutional neural
network
Fig. 4.1(a) illustrates an example of an artificial neural network based on multi-
layer perceptron (MLP). A set of neurons are arranged in multiple layers and neurons
in subsequent layers are fully connected. Each neuron takes the outputs of its previ-
ous layer as inputs, perform an inner-product between the inputs and a weight vector
and pass the result into a nonlinear activation function to produce an output for this
neuron. During training, a set of data-label pairs is used to tune the weights (using
back-propagation algorithm) such that the prediction error for the training data is
minimized. After the weights are learned, a forward-propagation of the neural net-
work will output a predicted label given an input data. This forward-propagation is
also known as testing or inference. A variant of MLP is called Convolutional neural
network (CNN) [83]. CNN is a promising neural network model that has shown its
effectiveness in various classification applications such as computer vision [83, 84].
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: Neural chip: (a) core components; (b) processing element
Fig. 4.1(b) shows a simple CNN example. It normally consists of a few common
building blocks, namely convolutional layers, pooling layers and fully-connected lay-
ers.
4.2.2 Neurnal Network Chips
In order to improve the flexibility to support more neural network models,
many neural chip designs have been proposed, such as DianNao [78], EIE [79], and
TPU [81]. These neural chips have emerged as a perfect platform for achieving fast
and low-power computation for a wide range of neural network models. Fig. 4.2(a)
shows some core components that are commonly shared among most neural chip
designs, including a control unit, an arithmetic unit, buffers (for input, weight, and
output), interconnect components, and a memory interface to external memory.
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The arithmetic unit is an important component because it performs vector mul-
tiplication, the most fundamental operation in neural networks. For example, in
AlexNet [84], more than 96% of weights are used in the fully-connected layers and
these weights require a massive amount of vector multiplication operations. The
arithmetic unit is formed by a group of processing elements (PEs), which is com-
posed of an array of multipliers and an adder tree [78, 85] as shown in Fig. 4.2(b).
To map a neural network design into the chip, a compiler will translate network
specifications (e.g., number of layers, layer types and layer sizes) into a set of in-
structions and store them into the control unit. Besides, pre-trained weights will
normally be stored in an external memory.
4.2.3 Anti-SAT Based Logic Locking
To access advanced semiconductor technology, modern chips are increasingly
outsourced to an offshore foundry for fabrication. The outsourced chip designs,
however, are subject to attacks such as piracy, overproduction, and counterfeiting by
the untrusted foundry. Neural chips, following this trend of fabrication outsourcing,
are inevitably subject to these threats. One class of prevention technique is logic
locking, which was introduced in Section 2.2.2. During design time, a circuit is
locked by inserting a set of key-gates and key-inputs. The locked chip preserves
the correct functionality only when a correct key is provided. Anti-SAT based
logic locking is a sophisticated logic locking techniques, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Such a logic locking would render the SAT attack [24] which attempts to learn
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Table 4.1: Terminology list
Symbol Definiton Symbol Definition
n Input-size of original circuit λ SAT attack iterations
nas Input-size of Anti-SAT ε Error rate
~X Inputs of original circuit λ0, ε0 Lower-bounds of λ and ε
~Xas Inputs of Anti-SAT g0 Mini-blocks of Strong Anti-SAT
Yas Output of Anti-SAT n0 Input-size of mini-block g0
~Ka Conventional keys p0 On-set size of mini-block g0
~Kb Anti-SAT keys t SAT solving time per iteration
g, g Logic blocks of Anti-SAT T Total SAT solving time
p On-set size of logic block g T0 Lower-bound of T
the perfectly-correct key ineffective. Here we review the design of Anti-SAT and
analyze its SAT-attack resistance and output corruptibility. The terminologies used
are listed in Table 4.1.
4.2.3.1 Anti-SAT Configuration
Fig. 4.3(a) shows the overview of Anti-SAT based logic locking. The original
circuit is locked with ~Ka (referred to as conventional keys) using conventional locking
techniques such as [22, 47]. Besides, an Anti-SAT block is attached to the locked
circuit. The Anti-SAT has inputs ~Xas which are connected to some primary inputs
~X of the original circuit. The Anti-SAT output Yas is connected to an internal wire
of the original circuit using an XOR gate. A set of keys ~Kb (referred to as Anti-SAT
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.3: Anti-SAT based logic locking: (a) overview; (b) Anti-SAT block
keys) are inserted at the Anti-SAT block. Fig. 4.3(b) shows the detail of Anti-
SAT block. It is composed of two logic blocks g and g which have complementary
functionalities. The Anti-SAT keys ~Kb = ( ~Kb1, ~Kb2) are inserted at each input of
g and g. The outputs of g and g are fed into a 2-input AND gate to produce the
Anti-SAT output Yas, which makes Yas = g( ~Xas ⊕ ~Kb1) ∧ g( ~Xas ⊕ ~Kb2). Given a
wrong key, Yas will output 1 and inject faults into the circuit. The logic block g in
Anti-SAT has input-size nas and on-set size p, where on-size size is the number of
input patterns that can make function g output one.
4.2.3.2 SAT-Attack Resilience
According to Theorem 3.4.1 in Chapter 3, the number of SAT attack iterations
λ required to unlock the Anti-SAT block is bounded by λ0:
λ ≥ λ0 =
22nas − 2nas
p× (2nas − p)
(4.1)
As seen in Eq. (4.1), when p→ 1 or p→ 2nas − 1, we have
λ ≥ λ0 = 2nas (4.2)
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which shows the exponential increase of SAT attack complexity. When p = 1, g
could simply be an nas-bit AND gate. In the remaining of this paper, we by default
assume Anti-SAT blocks have p = 1 as it can ensure exponential increase of λ0.
4.2.3.3 Output Corruptibility (Error Rate)
Here we analyze the output corruptibility of the Anti-SAT block. According
to [31], when p = 1, for any wrong key into ~Kb, only 1 out of 2
nas input patterns
(w.r.t ~Xas) can make incorrect output Yas = 1. Let’s denote such corrupted input




wrong key. Now let us analyze the error rate of a circuit that’s comprised of the
Anti-SAT block. Assume the circuit has n inputs and nas out of them are used for
the Anti-SAT inputs. The corrupted input patterns would be such that 1) the nas
primary inputs that are connected to the Anti-SAT have values as ~Xwas; and 2) the
other n−nas primary inputs can take any values. Thus, we have 2(n−nas) corrupted
input patterns (w.r.t ~X) that can make incorrect output Yas = 1, so the error rate of





. As seen, although reducing nas can increase
ε, it inevitably reduces λ as illustrated in Eq. (4.2).
4.2.4 AppSAT Attack
In [41], Shamsi et al. proposed an approximate SAT (AppSAT) attack which
targets locking techniques such as Anti-SAT [31] and SARLock [70]. The AppSAT
attack assumes the same attack model as the one used for SAT attack (see Sec-
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tion 3.2). It extends the SAT attack by adding an early termination condition to
avoid taking an exponential number of iterations to find a correct key. When the
early termination condition is satisfied, the AppSAT terminates and outputs the
approx-key which can match all already found distinguishing inputs to their correct
outputs. As shown in [41], after a few iterations, the AppSAT attack can deci-
pher an approx-key which has correct conventional keys ~Ka but incorrect Anti-SAT
keys ~Kb (see Fig. 4.3(a)). This is because that the keys ~Ka inserted at the original
netlist have high output-corruptibility and each distinguishing input/output pair
can eliminate a large number of wrong keys w.r.t. the ~Ka. As a result, the ~Ka are
gradually learned in the first few iterations, hence leaving the circuit that’s only
locked with ~Kb. Since the Anti-SAT keys ~Kb have very low corruptibility as dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.3.3, the approx-key can effectively de-obfuscate most of the
correct functionality.
4.3 Attack on Locked Neural Chips
In this section, we investigate the security of neural chips when its arithmetic
units (adders and multipliers) are locked with Anti-SAT based logic locking [31]. As
discussed in Section 4.2.3, this locking technique utilizes a combination of conven-
tional logic locking [22, 47] (with conventional keys ~Ka) and Anti-SAT block (with
Anti-SAT keys ~Kb) which represents among the strongest defenses to SAT attack.
Such locking technique would render the SAT attack which attempts to learn the
correct key ineffective. However, we propose an attack methodology to show that
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such sophisticated locking scheme is not secure for neural chips.
4.3.1 Attack Model
The proposed attack methodology consists of two steps, which exploits 1) the
AppSAT attacks [41] and 2) neural model fine-tuning in effective ways. In the
AppSAT attack step, we assume that the attacker is an untrusted foundry and
its objective is to obtain an approx-key to approximately unlock the chip. In the
neural-model fine-tuning step, the attacker can be the untrusted foundry or an end-
user who is in collusion with the untrusted foundry. The attacker’s objective is
to deploy a neural model to the approx-unlocked neural chips. To achieve a high
classification accuracy, the attacker wants to tune his neural model to adapt to the
approx-unlocked neural chip.
Neural chips are normally composed of a control unit, an arithmetic unit, a
memory interface and an interconnect unit. These components can be locked to
protect the neural chips. For simplicity, we target the locking of the arithmetic
unit (i.e., adders and multipliers) in this work. The adders and multipliers perform
the most fundamental and frequent operation of the neural network, i.e., vector
multiplication. Hence, as a natural choice, we assume that the attacker inserts the
key-gates into the adders/multipliers to lock the core functionality of the neural
chip. However, some of our proposed techniques can be extended and applied to
other components.
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4.3.2 Step 1: Approx-unlocking Neural Chips
Different from conventional chips, the neural chips are designed for neural net-
work applications that are normally error-tolerant. By exploiting the error-tolerant
nature, an attacker only needs to obtain an approx-key which can unlock most (but
not all) of the correct functionality for the neural chips. This relaxed requirement
makes attacks such as AppSAT [41] applicable. As shown in [41] and in this work,
after a few iterations, the AppSAT attack can decipher the conventional keys ~Ka
but not the Anti-SAT keys ~Kb. This is because that the output corruptibility of ~Ka
is much higher than that of ~Kb. Therefore, as iteration progresses, ~Ka is gradually
learned, thereby leaving a circuit that’s only locked using the Anti-SAT block with
keys ~Kb. As analyzed in Section 4.2.3.3, the error rate of such locking scheme is
ε = 1
2nas
. For typical nas, this error rate may be very small thereby resulting in
an approx-unlocked circuit which is correct for most input patterns. The AppSAT
attack results on locked adders/multipliers will be shown in Section 4.3.4.2.
4.3.3 Step 2: Neural-network Fine-tuning
Now let us suppose on such approx-unlocked neural chips, an attacker wishes
to deploy a neural model. The attacker may just deploy his model on the approx-
unlocked chips directly and tolerate a rather humble degradation in quality. Or he
may exploit knowledge of the error characteristics of the approx-unlocked chips and
tune the neural model to avoid high error scenarios. Here we assume the attacker
has the ability to fine-tune his own neural model and schedule its computation
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to specific arithmetic modules in the neural chips. The objective of the attack is
to reduce the number of incorrect computations based on the observation that the
classification accuracy would increase as the computation error decreases. To achieve
this objective, we propose a neural network fine-tuning technique which consists of
three steps: error profiling, weight tuning, and adder-input shifting.
4.3.3.1 Error Profiling
After acquiring the approx-unlocked neural chip, the attacker can first profile
the error distribution for both the approx-unlocked multipliers and adders. The
error profile represents the numerical distance between incorrect outputs and correct
outputs for given input operands. If enumerating all possible I/Os is impractical, an
attacker can randomly sample a large subset of I/Os to estimate the error profile.
4.3.3.2 Weight Tuning
In neural-network models, inputs of neurons are multiplied with neural weights,
which are computed by the multipliers in the arithmetic unit. The pre-trained weight
values are known and tunable by the attackers. Recent studies have found that mi-
nor weight changes (e.g., weight quantization or fine-tuning) would not affect the
classification accuracy of the neural model, which has been widely exploited for var-
ious hardware optimization [86]. In this work, we fine-tune the weights for another
purpose, which is to reduce the number of computation error thereby improving
classification accuracy. To reduce the error, an attacker can tune a weight to an-
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other value in its vicinity such that the new weight will have less multiplication






subject to |wmi,j − wi,j| ≤ σ
(4.3)
Here wi,j is the j-th pre-trained weight at i-th layer, w
m
i,j is the modified weight,
σ is the limit for weight tuning, error(wmi,j × d) is the absolute numerical error for
multiplying the weight wmi,j with data d, and Di,j is the typical set of values that the
weight wi,j is multiplied with. For each weight, Di,j is either the set of training data
values or the intermediate output values of neurons, so it can be easily estimated
based on a set of training data. In our implementation, the weights are fine-tuned
layer by layer. After updating all the weights at layer i based on Di,j, we compute
the neuron outputs which are used in the next layer as Di+1,j. We repeat the weight
tuning process until every layer is tuned. Since weight tuning deviates the weights
from the ones learned from training data, a large change in weights might instead
decrease accuracy. Therefore, in this work, σ is set to be a very small value. For
example, for a weight which is represented as a fixed-point number with q bits for
its fraction part, we set σ = 2−q.
4.3.3.3 Adder-input Shifting
Unlike multipliers where one input is a tunable weight, the adders accept
intermediate values as inputs that are not directly tunable. To reduce the error, we
propose an adder-input shifting technique. The basic idea is shown in Fig. 4.4(a).
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: Adder-input shifting: (a) illustration; (b) implementation
Recall that the attacker has an error profile of the approx-unlocked adder which
represents the error distribution over two adder inputs (red region in Fig. 4.4(a)).
Besides, because the attacker has the ability to schedule the computation to the
arithmetic operator, he can obtain an input profile for adder based on a set of
training data, which represents the data distribution over two adder inputs (blue
region in Fig. 4.4(a)). Based on these two distributions, the attacker can shift two
adder inputs by a constant value δ in opposite directions:
A+B → (A+ δ) + (B − δ) (4.4)
such that the new data distribution for (A + δ) and (B − δ) will be away from the
error distribution. To implement the adder-input shifting, the attacker can modify
his neural network as shown in Fig. 4.4(b). Each add operation is now realized by
three add operations as shown in Eq. (4.4). Besides, he needs to modify the data




In this experiment, the neural chip under attack uses 16-bit fixed-point adders
and multipliers (7 bits for fractional part). Such arithmetic operators can preserve
high classification accuracy while saving power and area, which is widely used in
modern neural chip designs [78–80]. The adders and multipliers are locked using
Anti-SAT based logic locking. The original circuit is locked with keys ~Ka which has
key-size | ~Ka| = 5%× #Gates of the original circuit. Besides, a 16-input obfuscated
Anti-SAT block (with p = 1) was attached to the locked circuit, which has key-size
| ~KB| = 4× 16 = 64. The 16 inputs of Anti-SAT are randomly connected to 16 out
of 32 primary inputs of the adder/multiplier. Such locking scheme can cost the SAT
attack more than 1 year to find the correct key [31].
4.3.4.2 Attack Result 1: Approx-unlocking
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, in the first step of our proposed attack method-
ology, we utilize the AppSAT attack to find an approx-key to de-obfuscate most
of the correct functionality. Fig. 4.5 shows the AppSAT attack progress. As seen,
for both the adder and the multiplier, the error rate ε starts at 100% for a random
key. However, ε drops dramatically during the first 30 iterations and it continues
to decrease gradually as the attack proceeds. These results show the efficiency of
AppSAT attack on finding an approx-key which can achieve low error rate. In this
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Figure 4.5: Error rate v.s. SAT attack iteration. The error rate is estimated using
10000 random input patterns.
Figure 4.6: Error profiles of approx-unlocked adder/multiplier
experiment, the AppSAT attack is terminated at 5000 iterations and it outputs
an approx-key denoted as ~KApp. Fig. 4.6 illustrates the error distribution for the
approx-unlocked adder/multiplier with ~KApp. The colored region shows the error
distribution over the input space (blank space means no error). Also, the color bar
on the right of each figure shows the absolute numerical distance between correct
and incorrect outputs.
Five neural-network models (as listed in Table 4.2) are used to evaluate the
performance of the approx-unlocked chip. The neural network is simulated using
Ristretto [86], a neural network framework based on Caffe. To simulate the arith-
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MNIST 10 10000 LeNet
SVHN 10 10000 CIFAR10 Full
CIFAR10 10 10000 CIFAR10 Quick
ILSVRC-2012 1000 500 CaffeNet
Oxford102 102 1000 CaffeNet
metic error, error profiles of the approx-unlocked adder and multiplier are embedded
into the simulation tool. Table 4.3 shows the accuracy of 5 models running on a
neural chip that’s unlocked with a correct key ~KC and an approx-key ~KApp. We can
see that the relative accuracy loss of an approx-unlocked neural chip is only 7.20%
on average. This is due to the low error rate of the approx-unlocked circuits as well
as the inherent error-tolerant nature of neural networks.
4.3.4.3 Attack Result 2: Neural-network Fine-tuning
From Table 4.3, we can see that the accuracy decreases more for large bench-
mark such as ILSVRC-2012. Here we evaluate the effectiveness of our neural-network
fine-tuning technique in further improving the accuracy. For weight tuning, we set
σ = 2−q = 2−7. For adder input shifting, we first plot the adder input distribution
for 5 benchmarks based on 100 training data, as shown in Fig. 4.7 . Based on Fig. 4.6
(left) and Fig. 4.7, we select the shift distance δ to be 50 as it can shift the input
distribution away from the error region. As shown in the last column of Table 4.3,
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Table 4.3: Accuracy of neural models deployed on a neural chip that’s unlocked with
a correct key ~KC and an approx-key ~KApp (without/with neural network fine-tuning)
Benchmark








MNIST 99% 98.51% 0.49% 99% 0%
SVHN 93.51% 92.64% 0.93% 93.51% 0%
CIFAR10 75.37% 69.75% 7.46% 75.37% 0%
ILSVRC-2012 41.40% 33.20% 19.81% 41.40% 0%
Oxford102 87.60% 81.20% 7.31% 87.60% 0%
Average - - 7.20% - 0%
fine-tuning improves the accuracy of all 5 benchmarks. The accuracy loss is reduced
to 0% for all benchmarks.
These results together demonstrate that an attacker can use the proposed
attack methodology to approx-unlock a neural chip and fine-tune his neural network
models to accommodate the approx-unlocked neural chips so as to achieve better
accuracy.
4.4 Secure Locking for Neural Chips
The attack results in Section 4.3.4 illustrate that AppSAT can easily decipher
an approx-key to obtain approx-unlocked adders/multipliers with low error rate.
The low error rate of approx-unlocked adders/multipliers leads to a humble degra-
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Figure 4.7: Adder input distribution for 5 benchmarks
dation in classification accuracy for neural models that are deployed on the approx-
unlocked chips. In addition, the low error rate also facilitates the fine-tuning step,
which makes the approx-unlocked neural chip work better for fine-tuned models.
To thwart the proposed attack scheme, we need to ensure that the error rate of an
approx-unlocked chip is sufficiently high. One possible approach is to increase the
output corruptibility of the Anti-SAT block (e.g., by reducing nas). However, if
nas is reduced, the complexity of exact SAT attack for finding a correct key would
surely come down, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.3. Hence there are two competing
objectives:
1. AppSAT type attacks should have high error rate to ensure a sufficient quality
degradation in application level;
2. The complexity of exact SAT attack to determine the correct key should still
be very high.
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In this section, we propose a secure locking scheme which aims at achieving these two
objectives simultaneously. The proposed locking technique is based on a co-design
of the locking infrastructure (i.e., a modified Anti-SAT block) and the functional
modules (i.e., the multipliers).
4.4.1 Strong Anti-SAT: Increasing Error Rate
4.4.1.1 Strong Anti-SAT Configuration
To ensure that AppSAT type attacks should have a high error rate, we propose
a modified Anti-SAT block (referred to as Strong Anti-SAT ) which makes two modi-
fications to existing Anti-SAT block. Firstly, the Strong Anti-SAT block decomposes
the logic block g of Anti-SAT (shown in Fig. 4.3(b)) into m mini-blocks g0, as shown
in Fig. 4.8. Each mini-block g0 has n0 inputs and on-set size p0 (1 ≤ p0 ≤ 2n0 − 1).
We use ~Kjb1 and
~Kjb2 to denote the portion of key-inputs into the j-th mini-block
of logic block g and g, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Also, we use ~Xj to denote the portion
of Anti-SAT inputs into the j-th mini-block of logic block g and g. The outputs
of the mini-blocks in g and g are denoted as Y jb1 and Y
j
b2, respectively. We enforce





there must exist an input ~Xj such that g0( ~X
j ⊕ ~Kjb1) 6= g0( ~Xj ⊕ ~K
j
b2). This means
that a mismatch between two keys must make the function g0 output differently
for some input patterns. This condition ensures that a key for Strong Anti-SAT
~K = ( ~Kb1, ~Kb2) is a wrong key if ~Kb1 6= ~Kb2.
The second modification in the Strong Anti-SAT is that, when locking a circuit
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Figure 4.8: An n-input Strong Anti-SAT block. Each mini-block g0 has n0 inputs
and on-set size p0.
with n primary inputs, we enforce the Strong Anti-SAT block to have nas = n inputs.
Such enforcement ensures that every primary input can affect the Anti-SAT block,
thereby making the error more uniformly distributed across the input space. In the
remaining of this chapter, we assume nas = n and use ~X and n to denote the inputs
and input-size of both the original circuit and the Strong Anti-SAT block. So for
n-input Strong Anti-SAT, we have m = n/n0 mini-blocks in g.
4.4.1.2 Error Rate Analysis
In this section, we will derive an error rate lower-bound ε0 of the Strong Anti-
SAT block. Such ε0 holds for any wrong key and it can be tuned to a large value,
so AppSAT type attacks will not be able to decipher a “good” enough approx-key.
Theorem 4.4.1. The error rate of an n-input Strong Anti-SAT block (in Fig. 4.8)




for any wrong key.
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Proof. We prove this theorem by first deriving the form of wrong keys and corrupted
input patterns. Then, for any given wrong key, we analyze the number of ways to
construct a corrupted input pattern and then compute the error rate.
1. Firstly, we recall that the Strong Anti-SAT preserves the constant-output
property as the Anti-SAT. In other words, given a correct key, the output
Yas in Fig. 4.8 should always output 0 for all inputs ~X. On the other hand,
given a wrong key, Yas can output 1 for some input patterns. Note that a key
for Strong Anti-SAT ~Kb = ( ~Kb1, ~Kb2) is a wrong key if ~Kb1 6= ~Kb2, as discussed
earlier.
2. Now, we fix ~Kb = ( ~Kb1, ~Kb2) to some wrong keys which satisfy ~Kb1 6= ~Kb2,
and analyze the number of possible assignments to inputs ~X that can produce
incorrect output Yas = 1. Without loss of generality, let’s assume that these
two key-input vectors ~Kb1 and ~Kb2 differ in the portion that’s connected to
the first mini-block, i.e., the wrong key has ~K1b1 6= ~K1b2 and all other key-bits
can be either 0 or 1 1.
3. As shown in Fig. 4.8, to make Yas = 1, the Anti-SAT block should have Yg = 1
and Yg = 1, which requires that
∀j ∈ [1,m], Y jb1 = g0( ~X
j ⊕ ~Kjb1) = 1 (4.5)
1Note that we can repeat the analysis for m groups of wrong keys, where the j-th group satisfies
that ~Kjb1 6= ~K
j
b2 while all other key-bits can be 0 or 1. Here we only focus on the first group of
wrong key for the simplicity of explanation.
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and
∃j ∈ [1,m], Y jb2 = g0( ~X
j ⊕ ~Kjb2) = 0 (4.6)
The corrupted input patterns for ~X = ( ~X1, ..., ~Xm) must be those that satisfy
both Eq. (4.5) and Eq. (4.6).
4. We now show that for the fixed wrong key as assumed in step 3, the number of
ways to construct a corrupted input pattern based on conditions Eq. (4.5) and
Eq. (4.6) would be at least pm−10 = p
n/n0−1
0 . Since we have assumed a wrong
key with ~K1b1 6= ~K1b2, we can know that the inputs to the first mini-block in g
(which is ~X1⊕ ~K1b1) and the inputs to first mini-block in g (which is ~X1⊕ ~K1b2)
are different. Given ~K1b1 6= ~K1b2 and ~X1 ⊕ ~K1b1 6= ~X1 ⊕ ~K1b2, there must exist
at least one way to construct ~X1 such that the Y 1b1 = g0(
~X1 ⊕ ~K1b1) = 1 and
Y 1b2 = g0(
~X1 ⊕ ~K1b2) = 0 2. With this, the condition in Eq. (4.6) is satisfied.
The only remaining conditions that need to satisfied is Y jb1 = 1, j ∈ [2,m] in
Eq. (4.5). We want to compute the number of ways to construct the other
inputs ~Xj, j ∈ [2,m] to satisfy the remaining conditions in Eq. (4.5). Since
we assume the mini-block g0 has on-set size p0, for any key into g0, there exists
p0 ways to select an input assignment for ~X
i to ensure Y ib1 = 1. Therefore,
each portion of inputs ~Xj (j ∈ [2,m]) can be selected in p0 ways. Since ~X1
can be selected in at least one way and each ~Xj (j ∈ [2,m]) can be selected
in p0 ways, the total number of ways to construct a corrupted input pattern
2 Note that in Section 4.4.1.1, we have enforced that, if ~Kjb1 6= ~K
j
b2, then there must exist an
input ~Xj such that g0( ~X




would be at least pm−10 = p
n/n0−1
0 .
5. We can repeat above analysis for any other m− 1 group of wrong keys, where
the j-th group satisfies ~Kjb1 6= ~K
j
b2, j ∈ [2,m]. Each group of wrong keys can
corrupt p
n/n0−1
0 input patterns, however these corrupted input patterns might
not be mutually exclusive. Therefore, we conclude that for any wrong key, the
number of corrupted input patterns is ≥ p(n/n0−1)0 .
6. Since the total number of input patterns is 2n, the error rate for any wrong
key is







Theorem 4.4.1 provides a rigorous error rate lower-bound ε0 of the Strong
Anti-SAT block for any wrong key. Based on Theorem 4.4.1, we can design an n-
input Strong Anti-SAT block with a guarantee of high error rate by tuning n0 and
p0. Hence AppSAT will never be able to find a key whose error rate is smaller.
4.4.2 Multiplier Design: Increasing SAT Solving Time Per Iteration
Since the logic block g in the Strong Anti-SAT block has input-size nas = n
and on-set size p = pm0 = p
(n/n0)
0 , the number of SAT attack iterations for finding a
correct key becomes















As can be seen in Eq. (4.7) and Eq. (4.8), for p0 = 1 the error rate and the SAT
iterations are exactly those for Anti-SAT. Now tuning n0 and p0 can help increase
the error rate but as illustrated this will impact the number of SAT iterations. One
way to counter this degradation in the number of SAT iterations is to investigate
the design of functional units which are inherently very slow in completing each
SAT iteration. Note that SAT is an NP-Complete problem. Hence by appropriate
design of the functional units, we may be able to ensure that the each SAT iteration





) iterations, even though smaller
than 2n, is actually practically impossible. To maintain a large total SAT solving
time, we propose to increase the size of multipliers in the arithmetic units. Modern
neural chips [78–80] use 16-bit (or even smaller) fixed-point multiplier to save power
and area. However, such a small multiplier is easily solvable by SAT solvers. A
large multiplier, on the contrary, has been considered as a circuit that’s hard for
SAT solvers based on the conjecture that factoring large integers is difficult [87].
Experiments in [88] showed that the SAT solving time for factoring integers could
increase exponentially in the operand width w. As will be shown in Section 4.5, the
SAT solving time per iteration will also increase exponentially in w. Thus, we can
maintain a high SAT attack complexity by using a larger multiplier 3.
3Since we enforce that the Strong Anti-SAT has the same number of inputs as the locked circuit
(nas = n), the size of the multiplier and the Strong Anti-SAT are both determined by n. Increasing
n will increase the size of multipliers and Strong Anti-SAT.
90
4.4.3 Summary of Attack Mitigation
In summary, our attack mitigation is based on a co-design of the Strong Anti-
SAT block and the multiplier modules. Firstly, appropriate choice of n0 and p0 of
the Strong Anti-SAT can be designed to achieve a desired error rate lower-bound.
Also, by enforcing the Strong Anti-SAT inputs to connect to all primary inputs
~Xas = ~X, we ensure that every primary input can affect the Anti-SAT block, thereby
making the error more uniformly distributed across the input space. Secondly, a
large multiplier design is utilized to increase the SAT solving time per iteration.
Together these would 1) counter the AppSAT attack and the fine-tuning attack
because the error rate of locked arithmetic units is sufficiently high for any approx-
key, and 2) counter the exact SAT attack because the total SAT solving time for
finding the correct key is extremely long (e.g., ≥ 1 year).
4.5 Experiments and Results
This section shows the experimental results of our proposed secure locking
technique for neural chips.
4.5.1 Validation of Analytical Lower Bounds
In Section 4.4.1, we discuss the configuration of a Strong Anti-SAT block and
analyze the lower-bounds for error rate ε0 and the number of required SAT iteration
λ0 as shown in Eq. (4.7) and Eq. (4.8). To validate the correctness of two analytical
lower-bounds, we designed a 16-input Strong Anti-SAT block with different (n0, p0)
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Table 4.4: Error rate ε and the number of SAT iterations λ of a 16-input Strong
Anti-SAT block with different (n0, p0). ε0 and λ0 are the analytical lower-bounds.
ε is the experimental error rate obtained by simulating all 216 input patterns. λ is
the experimental number of iteration required by SAT attack.
n=16
(n0, p0) (2,1) (2,3) (4,7) (4,8) (4,13) (4,15)
ε0 1.53E-05 3.34E-02 5.23E-03 7.81E-03 3.35E-02 5.15E-02
ε 1.53E-05 9.13E-02 3.57E-02 3.66E-02 2.16E-01 1.86E-01
λ0 65536 12 29 18 5 6
λ 65536 364 656 1334 344 187
and test their actual error rate and SAT iterations. The result is shown in Table 4.4.
As seen, for different (n0, p0), we always have ε ≥ ε0 and λ ≥ λ0, which validates
the correctness of our analysis for the lower-bounds ε0 and λ0.
4.5.2 Error Rate and Accuracy Loss
In Fig. 4.9, we plot ε0 and λ0 for an n-input Strong Anti-SAT block with
different (n0, p0). For each n ∈ (32, 48, 64, 80), we set n0 = 4 and increase p0 from
1 to 15. As seen in Fig. 4.9(a), by increasing p0, the ε0 will increases substantially.
For different n, we can always find a configuration (n0, p0) such that the ε0 is larger
than a desired error rate. A desired ε0 can be estimated to a value such that neural
applications of interest are guaranteed to have a high accuracy loss. To estimate
a desired ε0, we simulate the relationship between accuracy loss of neural models
and error rate of multipliers for 5 benchmarks, as illustrated in Fig. 4.10. Based
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Figure 4.9: Lower-bounds of (a) error rate ε0; (b) SAT iterations λ0 for different
Strong Anti-SAT configurations (n, n0, p0).
on this figure, we can estimate a desired ε0 for the multiplier to achieve a sufficient
application-level accuracy loss. For example, if we want to achieve 50% averaged
accuracy loss, a desired ε0 for the multiplier is estimated to be 10
−6. Using such an
analysis we can estimate the desired ε0 for the multipliers which can then be used
to design the Strong Anti-SAT block (by tuning n0 and p0).
4.5.3 SAT Solving Iterations and Execution Time
Increasing ε0, however, will inevitably decreases λ0, as discussed in Section 4.4.2.
This is validated in Fig. 4.9(b), which shows that λ0 decreases as p0 increases. To
counter this degradation in the number of SAT iterations, we proposed to use a
larger multiplier (which multiplies operands with larger bit-width w) 4. Let’s de-
note the SAT solving time per iteration as t. Fig. 4.11 shows the t for different
4The input-size of the multiplier is n = 2w.
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Figure 4.10: Accuracy loss v.s. error
rate of multiplier for 5 benchmarks.






























Figure 4.11: SAT solving time per iter-
ation for n-input locked multiplier
n-input fixed-point multipliers locked with Anti-SAT. It’s computed by running the
SAT attack in 10 hours and then dividing it by the number of iterations the at-
tack can process. As seen, as the input-size n increases, t increases exponentially.
To validate the extrapolated exponential increase, we run the SAT attack on a 56-
input locked multiplier and find that it can only process 1 iteration in 2.41E+05
seconds (about 67 hours), which is the estimated value based on the exponential
curve. Hence such a predictive approach can be used to estimate an appropriate
multiplier size for achieving certain t to ensure sufficient total SAT solving time.
Based on λ0 in Fig. 4.9(b) and t in Fig. 4.11, we can compute the lower-bound of
total SAT solving time T0 = t× λ0 for each tuple (n, n0, p0) and see if it can satisfy
a pre-defined requirement on the total SAT solving time.
In Fig. 4.12, we plot the relationship between T0 and ε0 for different config-
urations of (n, n0, p0). This is useful for selecting a locking configuration that can
satisfy both the SAT solving time requirement T ≥ T0 and the error rate require-
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Figure 4.12: Total SAT solving time v.s. error rate
ment ε ≥ ε0. To obtain such plot, we first determine the (n, n0, p0) which can just
achieve certain ε0 based on Fig. 4.9(a). Then, we compute λ0 and T0 for each tuple
and show the relationship between T0 and ε0 in Fig. 4.12. As seen, we can always
select a configuration (n, n0, p0) so as to satisfy a desired ε0 and T0 simultaneously.
As an example, when (n, n0, p0) = (64, 4, 11), we have ε0 > 10
−4 and T0 > 1 year.
Such configuration would result in 80% accuracy loss for neural models running on
approx-unlocked chips, as shown in Fig. 4.10.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate both attack and defense methodologies for
locked neural chips. Our proposed attack methodology exploits existing SAT-based
attacks and neural model fine-tuning in effective ways. To counter this attack, we
propose a secure locking scheme based on a co-design of the locking infrastructure
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and the functional modules. Experimental results show that our proposed locking
scheme can effectively secure neural chips against the AppSAT attack as well as the
exact SAT attack.
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Chapter 5: Delay Locking: Security Enhancement of Logic Locking
Against Overproduction and Counterfeiting
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we discussed the vulnerability of many existing logic locking
techniques to a strong attack called SAT attack [24]. Countermeasures have been
proposed to mitigate the SAT attack [31,68,70], including our proposed Anti-SAT.
Basically, these countermeasures proposed to insert additional SAT-attack resistant
logic blocks such as the Anti-SAT block [31], the SARLock [70], or an AES block
with a fixed AES key [68] into the locked circuit to increase the SAT attack iterations
and execution time. Although effective, one limitation of all above countermeasures
is that these SAT-attack resistant logic blocks have a special and separable structure.
They may be removed or nullified by an attacker if they are identified. Then, the
SAT attack can be launched to unlock the circuit without these SAT-resistant logic
blocks. In this chapter, we propose a new technique called delay locking to enhance
the security of existing logic locking techniques. For delay locking, the key to a
locked circuit not only determines its functionality, but also its timing profile. A
functionality-correct but timing-incorrect key will result in timing violations and
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thus make the circuit malfunction. The SAT attack is thwarted because it cannot
be utilized to decipher a timing-correct key. The contributions of this work are as
follows.
• A delay+logic locking (DLL) technique is proposed to enhance the security of
existing logic locking techniques to prevent IC counterfeiting and overproduc-
tion. It obfuscates the timing profile of a circuit design such that an incorrect
key will violate timing constraints and thus make the circuit malfunction.
• A new type of key-gate called tunable delay key-gate (TDK) is introduced,
which has two types of keys: functional-key and delay-key. The functional-
key controls the TDK’s functionality while the delay-key determines its gate
delay.
• An overall DLL design flow is proposed, which allocates the new TDK gates
and designs the timing constraints for simultaneous functional and delay ob-
fuscation.
• Our proposed approach is fundamentally immune to previous attacks such
as the SAT attack because these attacks only focus on deciphering the cor-
rect functional-key. Finding the correct delay-key can be formulated to be
an instance of mixed-integer-linear-programming (MILP). However, necessary
constraint relaxations to satisfy the linear formulation make it fail to find
the correct delay-key (as discussed in Sec. 5.4.3). Hence our approach of si-




This work assumes the same attack model as discussed in Section 2.1.1. The
attacker is an untrusted foundry whose objective is to obtain the correct key of
a locked circuit and use it to unlock overproduced chips or out-of-spec counterfeit
chips. The malicious foundry has access to the following two components:
1. A locked gate-level netlist, which can be obtained by reverse-engineering the
layout file of the locked circuit provided by the designer.
2. An activated functional chip, which can be obtained from an open market.
This chip can be used to observe a set of correct I/O pairs as a black box.
5.3 Delay+Logic Locking (DLL)
To enhance the security of existing logic locking techniques, we propose a new
technique called delay locking that can thwart existing attacks on logic locking.
The basic idea of delay locking is to make the circuit’s delay dependent on the
key value. When logic locking is enhanced with delay locking, the key into a locked
circuit not only determines its functionality but also its timing profile. A correct key
value should recover the original combinational functionality as well as the correct
timing profile that can satisfy a set of pre-defined timing constraints. On the other
hand, a key is incorrect if it fails to recover a) the original functionality or b) the
correct timing profile. Since previous attack algorithms on logic locking (described
in Section 2.2.2.2) only focus on retrieving the correct combinational functionality,
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they are not guaranteed to recover the timing-correct key. A functionality-correct
but timing-incorrect key will result in timing violations and thus make the circuit
malfunction.
In the remaining of this section, we discuss how the delay locking is imple-
mented and introduce the design objectives, design techniques, and the overall design
flow of the DLL design.
5.3.1 Tunable Delay Key-gate (TDK)
To make the delay of a key-gate dependent on its key value, we propose a tun-
able delay key-gate (TDK). Fig. 5.1 illustrates the structure of the TDK, which com-
bines a conventional key-gate (XOR/XNOR) with a tunable delay buffer (TDB) [89].
TDB is a widely used solution for post-silicon adjustment of gate/circuit delays. One
typical application of TDBs is to correct timing violations that are induced by the
process, temperature and other variances. Various implementations of TDBs have
been proposed in the previous literature. One low-power TDB design is proposed by
Tsai et al. [89], which is based on two inverters with a set of NMOS-based capacitive
loads in between, as shown in Fig. 5.1(b). Each capacitive load is controlled by a
transmission gate. When the transmission gate is activated by its control signal, the
corresponding capacitive load is added into the path between the pair of inverters,
thus obtaining tunable delays.
As shown in Fig. 5.1, each TDK has two key-inputs, one feeding into the
XOR/XNOR gate (referred to as the functional-key) and the other feeding into the
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Tunable delay key-gate (TDK): (a) overview; (b) implementation
Table 5.1: Functionality and delay of the TDK
Key (k1k2) Functionality Delay
00 y = x d0
01 y = x d1
10 y = x̄ d0
11 y = x̄ d1
control signal of the TDB (referred to as the delay-key). The impact of the keys on
the functionality and delay of the TDK is shown in Table 5.1. The functional-key k1
determines whether the TDK behaves as a buffer or an inverter while the delay-key
k2 determines whether the TDK gate delay is d0 or d1. The TDK delay ratio
r = d1/d0 (5.1)
can be set at design time by tuning the capacitive load. This delay ratio has a great
impact on the circuit delay distribution across different key values as well as the
timing violation sensitivity, which will be discussed in Section 5.3.3.2.
In the remaining of the paper, we refer a circuit that’s locked with the TDKs
to be a delay-logic-locked circuit (DLL circuit).
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Figure 5.2: A simple sequential circuit.
5.3.2 Timing Constraints of DLL Circuit
Now we describe how the allocation of TDKs impacts the overall timing con-
straints of the design. We first describe the timing constraints for a conventional
sequential circuit, as shown in Fig. 5.2. Given a sequential design, we can represent
it as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of flip-flops (FFs) and E is a set
of edges representing the combinational logic paths between the FFs. We want to
analyze the timing constraints for the path delay between any two FFs i and j. Two
types of timing constraints are considered in a sequential circuit, namely longest-path
timing constraint and shortest-path timing constraint. In a nutshell, the longest-path
timing constraint ensures that the combinational netlist shall propagate the logic
computation in time to the destination FF. On the other hand, the shortest-path
timing constraint ensures that the combinational netlist shall not propagate too fast
such that it contaminates the correct value that needs to be stored in the destination
FF. The following formally describes these two timing constraints.
Let us assume that Ti and Tj are the clock arrival time at FFs i and j. Ti
and Tj may not be the same due to clock skews (the spatial variation in arrival time
of different FFs). Let Dlongij be the longest-path delay between FFs i and j, i.e.,
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the maximum delay among all combinational logic paths between two FFs i and
j. Let T jset be the setup time for FF j and Tclk be the clock period. To meet the
longest-path timing constraint, the circuit needs to satisfy:
Dlongij + T
j
set ≤ Tclk + Tj − Ti,∀i, j (5.2)
This longest-path timing constraint indicates that the clock period should be large
enough for the data to propagate through the combinational logic paths and to be
set up at the destination FF before the next trigging edge of the clock arrives.
Besides, the circuit should also satisfy the shortest-path timing constraint
(hold time constraint) between two FFs. Let Dshortij be the shortest-path delay be-
tween FFs i and j and T jhold be the hold time for FF j. The hold time of the
destination FF j must be shorter than the shortest-path delay through the combi-
national logic network, considering the clock skew phenomenon:
Dshortij ≥ T
j
hold + Tj − Ti,∀i, j (5.3)
Based on Eq. (5.2) and Eq. (5.3), we can represent the timing constraints for a DLL
circuit as follows. Let Dshortij ( ~K) and D
long
ij (
~K) be the shortest/longest path delay
between FFs i and j of a DLL circuit with a key ~K. The timing constraints for the
DLL circuit can be represented as:
Dshortij ( ~K) ≥ T
j
hold + Tj − Ti ≡ LBij
Dlongij (
~K) ≤ Tclk + Tj − Ti − T jset ≡ UBij
(5.4)
Eq. (5.4) enforces that the combinational path delays (for a correct key ~K = ~KC)
between two FFs should satisfy both the shortest and the longest timing constraints.
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Allocation of keys to the fastest or slowest corner may not be the correct timing
solution because a key that increases delay may violate the upper bound (UB) and a
key that decreases delay may violate the lower bound (LB). This makes the delay-key
determination problem very hard from an attacker’s standpoint.
5.3.3 DLL Design Flow
In this section, we introduce the design objectives, design techniques, and the
overall design flow of the DLL design. In general, the design problem is formulated
as follows: we want to achieve simultaneous functionality and delay obfuscation by
allocating the TDK gates and designing the timing constraints as shown in Eq. (5.4).
5.3.3.1 Design Objective
The objective of DLL design consists of two aspects:
1. Functionality obfuscation. The functionality of a circuit shall be obfuscated in
order to conceal the correct functionality when it passes through the untrusted
foundry and other potentially untrusted phases of the supply chain. This
requires the TDKs to be located in functionality-critical spots.
2. Delay obfuscation. The timing profile of the locked circuit should be obfuscated
in order to defend the functionality-oriented attacks such as SAT attack. For
an incorrect delay-key, at least one path will violate either the longest or the
shortest-path timing constraint as described in Eq. (5.4). This requires the
paths which comprise the TDKs to be timing-critical.
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(a) Technique 1: tighten upper or lower timing bounds
(b) Technique 2: path delay balancing
(c) Technique 3: increase TDK gate delay ratio r
Figure 5.3: Illustrative examples of three design techniques for delay locking
5.3.3.2 Design Techniques
The first design objective (functionality obfuscation) can be achieved by previ-
ously proposed key-gate insertion algorithms [20, 22,47], which insert the key-gates
to internal wires of a netlist to obfuscate the original functionality. However, such
locations might not belong to the timing-critical paths. Therefore, an incorrect key
might not result in sufficient timing violations to cause an error. To achieve better
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delay obfuscation, we need to make the paths which comprise the TDKs become
timing-critical. We propose the following three design techniques to achieve this.
1) Timing Bound Design. The timing bounds UBij or LBij shall be sufficiently
tightened to the longest or shortest path delay, respectively. In other words, either
UBij is set to be larger than but sufficiently close to D
long
ij (
~KC), or LBij is set to be
less than but sufficiently close to Dshortij ( ~KC), as illustrated in Fig. 5.3 (a). When
the bounds are sufficiently tight, it can ensure that the paths with delay values that
are very close to LBij or UBij can violate the timing bounds if the delay-keys are
incorrect. As shown in Eq. (5.4), LBij and UBij can be tuned by changing the clock
arrival time Ti and Tj, which can be controlled by the clock tree design [90]. Clock
tree design which exploits the tuning of Ti and Tj is also called useful-skew based
optimization. In this case, we exploit useful skews for security purpose.
2) Path Delay Balancing. The path delays shall be balanced such that every
path delay is close to the longest-path delay of the whole combinational block,
denoted as Dbalanced. Imbalanced path delays mean that TDKs on the non-critical
paths will not result in desired timing sensitivity. On the contrary, making all paths
almost equally critical would make the timing profiles sensitive to all TDKs. Hence,
path delay balancing makes it easier for the circuit to violate the timing constraints
when the delay-key is incorrect. Path delay balancing is a widely used technique
for eliminating glitches. There exist many approaches for path delay balancing. In
this work, we exploit gate sizing and buffer insertion [91] to achieve the path delay
balancing.
3) Increase TDK Delay Ratio r. The TDK delay ratio r shall be large enough
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to ensure a desired timing violation magnitude, i.e., the difference between an in-
correct delay and the violated timing bound. A larger r indicates that when a key
bit flips, the delays of the paths that comprise this TDK will increase or decrease
with a larger magnitude. Therefore, these paths would have more severe timing
violations, as shown in Fig. 5.3(c). A larger timing violation magnitude is preferred
because it indicates a higher probability of fault occurrences.
The above mentioned three techniques will be used to achieve a high timing
violation sensitivity to incorrect keys leading to maximum chances of delay locking
to be effective. To quantify the timing violation level of a DLL circuit with an
incorrect key, we define a security metric call timing violation ratio (TVR). For FFs
i and j, the TVR of a key ~K can be calculated as:
TV Rij( ~K) =
max{0, Dlongij ( ~K)− UBij, LBij −Dshortij ( ~K)}
Dbalanced
(5.5)
A larger TVR indicates more timing violation and a higher probability of fault
occurrences. On the other hand, for a correct key, there is not timing violation and
TVR is 0. Based on Eq.(5.5), we can define the TVR for the whole circuit as follows:
TV R( ~K) = max
FFs i,j
{TV Rij( ~K)} (5.6)
This metric captures the maximum timing violations (if any) among all pairs of FFs.
5.3.3.3 Design Flow
The overall delay locking design flow is shown in Fig. 5.4. It consists of two
design phases: logic locking and delay locking.
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Figure 5.4: DLL design flow
Logic Locking Phase: Given a netlist G and a (randomly generated) correct
key ~KC , we first integrate the TDK gates into the combinational block of the orig-
inal netlist and produce a locked netlist GL( ~K). The locations for the TDK gates
can be determined using previously proposed key-gate insertion algorithms, such as
random insertion [20], fault-analysis based insertion [47] and interference-analysis
based insertion [22], which is not the focus of this work.
Delay Locking Phase: In the delay locking phase, we apply three design tech-
niques as discussed in Section 5.3.3.2 to improve the timing violation sensitivity.
The TDK gate delay ratio r is gradually increased until the TV R( ~K) (defined
in Eq.(5.6)) for a random key is larger than a pre-defined security threshold TV Rth.
After the delay locking phase, we obtain the final DLL design G′L(
~K).
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5.4 Security Analysis of DLL
In this section, we analyze the security of DLL technique against different
attacks.
5.4.1 TDK Removal Attack
The attacker might attempt to nullify or bypass the TDK gates (either the
XOR/XNOR gate, the TDB, or both) in the DLL circuit by replacing it with a
normal wire. However, such attempt cannot recover the original functionality and
delay if he does not know the correct functional-key and delay-key. On one hand, a
TDK can function as a buffer or inverter depending on the functional-key. Replacing
it with a wire might flip the correct functionality. On the other hand, nullifying the
TDK gates (or just the TDB) is simply equivalent to decreasing the path delays,
which might violate the timing lower bound ensured by the shortest-path timing
constraint.
5.4.2 Functionality Oriented Attacks
As discussed earlier, previous attacks [22–24] on logic locking such as the SAT
attack algorithm are all functionality oriented, which means that an attacker only
focuses on finding a functionality-correct key w.r.t. the combinational logic of the
circuit. However, when the delay locking technique is utilized, the key obtained by
these attacks cannot unlock the overproduced locked chip because they are not guar-
anteed to obtain a timing-correct key. A circuit based on a functionality-correct (but
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not timing-correct) key will violate the pre-defined timing constraints and thus pro-
duce incorrect outputs, which will be shown in the experiment section (Section 5.5).
As a result, the functionality oriented attacks fail to unlock a chip that is enhanced
with the delay locking technique.
5.4.3 MILP Based Delay-key Attack
Assuming an attacker can obtain a correct functional-key using previously
proposed attacks, in order to unlock the circuit, he has to find a correct delay-key
that can satisfy all pre-defined timing constraints. Here we assume a stronger attack
model, where the attacker knows the timing LB and UB of all paths and he intends
to formulate a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) to solve the delay-key. A
straightforward formulation can set UB and LB as constraints for each path delay
and find a delay-key that satisfies these constraints. However, this direct formulation
is impractical because the number of possible signal paths can be exponential in the
total number of gates [92]. This issue can be handled by the classic technique which
divides the constraints on path delay into constraints on a gate’s arrival time [92].
Let ai denotes the arrival time of the output of a gate or a primary input i. Let
gi denotes the delay of a gate i. If it’s a TDK gate, then gi is dependent on the
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delay-key value denoted as xi. We can formulate the above problem as:
find ~x,~a
s.t. LBj ≤ aj ≤ UBj, ∀PO j
aj + gi ≤ ai, ∀gate i,∀j ∈ inputs(i)
gi ≤ ai, ∀PI i
gi = xi × d1 + (1− xi)× d0, ∀gate i ∈ TDK
xi = 0 or 1, ∀gate i ∈ TDK
(5.7)
But the above formulation might not recover the correct arrival time and delay-key
because the timing constraint for a gate ai = max{aj +gi},∀j ∈ inputs(i) is relaxed
to be ai ≥ aj + gi in order to form an MILP formulation. This relaxation will make
the arrival time ai inaccurate and result in an incorrect delay-key. As will be shown
in Section 5.5, the resulting key values from above MILP formulation will violate
the pre-defined timing constraints. The attacker can attempt to iteratively run the
MILP attack and add new constraints on the key values to prune out the incorrect
keys discovered in previous iterations. However, since each iteration can only prune
out one incorrect key, when key-size is large, the execution time to find a correct
delay-key will be exponential in the key-size, as will be shown in Section 5.5.
111
5.5 Experiments and Results
5.5.1 Experiment Setup
We validate the effectiveness of the delay locking technique using 8 sequential
benchmarks from ISCAS89. The benchmark information is shown in Table 5.2. Each
benchmark is synthesized using Cadence RTL compiler with SAED 90nm digital
standard cell library. Timing information of the standard cell library is extracted
for timing analysis.
For the TDK, when the delay-key k2 = 0 the gate delay d0 is the XOR/XNOR
gate delay plus a buffer delay. When k2 = 1, its gate delay is set to be d1 = r × d0,
where r is the delay ratio. The TDKs are implemented and simulated using Cadence
Virtuoso and its gate area and delay are obtained for overhead evaluation. In the
logic locking phase, we randomly generate a correct key and adopt the random key-
gate insertion algorithm [20] to insert key-gates into the combinational block of the
benchmark. The number of key-gates equals 10% the number of original gates, as
shown in Table 5.2. In the delay locking phase, we apply three design techniques
(Section 5.3.3.2) to improve delay obfuscation.
To evaluate the level of timing violation given an incorrect delay-key, we com-
pute the TVR (defined in Eq. (5.6)) for the DLL circuit under the case that the
functional-key values are all correct but the delay-key values are randomly gener-
ated. Noted that in the experiment we set the timing bounds to the balanced path
delay for the easy of TVR computation and comparison. The TVR is averaged over
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gates ( ~Kguess) ( ~Kguess)
s1488 336 6 34 44.12% 28.13%
s5378 748 179 75 58.67% 39.25%
s9234 1014 211 101 59.41% 34.60%
s13207 1924 638 192 63.02% 33.60%
s15850 1952 534 195 63.08% 27.64%
s35932 4763 1728 476 68.07% 26.18%
s38417 5066 1636 507 60.95% 31.87%
s38584 6857 1426 686 58.60% 36.39%
1000 random key trails.
5.5.2 Results
5.5.2.1 Effectiveness of Proposed Design Techniques
In this experiment, we validate the effectiveness of our proposed design tech-
niques (Section 5.3.3.2) in improving the level of timing violations. We assume
technique 1 is always applied and evaluate the impact of other two techniques: path
delay balancing and increasing TDK delay ratio r. Fig. 5.5 shows the TVR values
of different delay ratios r when the path delay balancing is applied (bold lines) and
when it’s not applied (dash lines). As seen, without path delay balancing (dash
lines), the TVR values of most benchmarks are below 5%, and increasing the delay
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Figure 5.5: The impact of path delay balancing and TDK delay ratio r on the TVR
for 8 ISCAS89 benchmarks.
ratio r cannot effectively achieve a higher TVR value. This is because that when
path delays are imbalanced, most TDKs are not on the timing-critical paths so an
incorrect delay-key cannot cause severe timing violations. When path delay balanc-
ing is applied (bold lines), we can see a remarkable improvement in TVR for all
choices of r. Besides, as r increases, the TVR value increases from about 8% to
39%. The value of r can be designed to achieve a desired TVR threshold.
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Figure 5.6: Iterative MILP attack results (Timeout is 10 hours)
5.5.2.2 MILP-based Delay-key Attack
As discussed in Section 5.4.3, a MILP formulation might be applied by an at-
tacker to find the delay-key. However, such formulation requires necessary constraint
relaxation to satisfy the linear formulation and thus fail to retrieve the original de-
lay and the correct delay-key. To validate this analysis, we implemented the MILP
formulation based attack. For each DLL circuit, r is set to 3 and path delay bal-
ancing is applied because they can result in a relatively large TVR value as shown
in Fig. 5.5. The correctness (# bits that are the same as the correct key) and the
corresponding TVR values of the MILP solution ~Kguess are computed and shown in
Table 5.2. As seen, the resulting delay-keys are incorrect for all benchmarks and
they will violate the timing constraints with an average TVR of 32.21%. We also
implement an iterative MILP attack which iteratively performs the MILP attack
and adds new constraints on the key values to prune out the incorrect keys discov-




Figure 5.7: Area and delay overhead for the DLL technique. Four bar plots of each
benchmark correspond to TDK delay ratios r = 2, 3, 4, 5
from 4 to 16 are shown in Fig. 5.6. As seen, since each iteration can only prune out
one incorrect key, as the key-size increases, the execution time for finding a correct
delay-key increases exponentially. When key-size is 16, the attack timeouts (≥10
hrs) for all benchmarks.
5.5.2.3 Overhead Evaluation
Fig. 5.7 shows the area and delay overhead of the DLL technique for 8 bench-
marks when compared to the conventional XOR/XNOR based logic locking. For
each benchmark, we vary the TDK delay ratio r and report its impact on area
and delay. Four bar plots of each benchmark correspond to r = 2, 3, 4, 5. As seen,
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when r increases from 2 to 5, the average area overhead increases from 4.36% to
5.29%. The area overhead mainly comes from the TDBs. A larger r requires a
larger capacitive load so it results in a slightly higher area overhead. The impact of
r is mainly reflected in the delay overhead. As seen, with r increases, the averaged
delay overhead increases from 11.88% to 64.03%. This is because that a larger r will
lead to a larger key-gate delay (if the correct delay-key is 1) and increase the delay
for the overall circuit. Combined with the result in Fig. 5.5, we can see that our
approach is capable of generating a tradeoff between the TVR and the performance
overheads. By tuning the TDK delay ratio r, we can achieve a desired TVR with
acceptable overheads.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a new technique called delay locking to enhance the
security of existing logic locking techniques. A tunable delay key-gate is proposed
to obfuscate both the functionality and timing profile of an IC design. An overall
delay+logic locking design flow is proposed to increase the timing violation sensi-
tivity to incorrect key values. The security of proposed delay locking technique is
evaluated with previous attacks and a new attack based on MILP. Both analytical
and experimental results show that such attacks fail to find the correct delay-key.
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Chapter 6: Security-aware Design Flow for 2.5D IC Split Fabrication
6.1 Introduction
The increasing trend of outsourced fabrication for modern chips makes circuit
designs vulnerable to IP piracy or counterfeiting by untrusted foundries. 2.5D IC
technology has shown the capability to counter this threat. By limiting the inter-
poser layer of a 2.5D IC that contains inter-chip connections to be fabricated in a
trusted foundry, the complete exposure of original design to an untrusted foundry
is prevented. This fabrication strategy is called split fabrication. In this chapter,
we propose a security-aware physical design flow for 2.5D IC technology to pre-
vent IP piracy. The partitioning phase utilizes the concepts of controllability and
observability to conceal the functionality of a design and the placement phase gen-
erates obfuscated chip layouts that can withstand layout-geometry based attacks
such as proximity attack. Simulation results show that our design flow is effective
for producing secure chip layouts for outsourcing whose original netlist and func-
tionality cannot be reverse-engineered based on the layout-geometry information.
The contributions of this work are as follows.
• We propose a security-aware physical design flow for 2.5D IC split fabrication
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to address the IP piracy threat in outsourced fabrication.
• A secure min-cut bi-partitioning algorithm based on the concepts of controlla-
bility and observability is proposed to reduce the cut-size while enforcing the
controllability and observability of wires in the cut-set are relatively high so
that incorrect connections between two partitions will lead to incorrect out-
puts. Hence incorrect reconnection of outsourced sub-netlists can’t disclose
the correct functionality.
• A secure simulated-annealing based placement algorithm is proposed to thwart
the layout-geometry based attack algorithm (i.e., proximity attack) while bal-
ancing the performance overhead on area and wire-length.
• We evaluate the security level of our design flow under proximity attack on 8
publicly available benchmarks. Simulation results show that our approach can
effectively prevent a malicious foundry from reverse-engineering the complete
functionality and netlist (46.35% Hamming distance and 0.27% correctness of
reconnection under proximity attack).
6.2 Preliminary
6.2.1 3D/2.5D Integration
Technology scaling which shrinks the physical feature size of transistors has
long been an effective approach to improve chip performance. However, this ap-


















Figure 6.1: Structures of (a) stacked 3D IC and (b) 2.5D IC.
miniaturization. This motivates the development of 3D integration technology.
3D integration is a technology that vertically integrates multiple 2D dies to
create a single high-performance chip named 3D IC. A common configuration of 3D
IC is shown in Fig. 6.1(a). Multiple 2D dies (which contain device/metal layers) are
stacked and interconnected using vertical connections called Through-Silicon-Vias
(TSVs). 3D integration reduces interconnect wire-length because two distant de-
vices in a conventional 2D design can be placed vertically close to each other and
connected with a shorter connection. The reduction in wire-length scales down inter-
connect power and delay, which can be leveraged by implementing a more highly con-
nected architecture such as the high-bandwidth memory-on-chip architecture [93].
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Moreover, 3D integration allows heterogeneous integration, which integrates com-
ponents of different materials and technologies into a single chip. Recent years have
seen a lot of research working on improving the performance and reliability of 3D
integration technology [94].
Two common structures of 3D ICs are stacked 3D IC and interposer-based
3D IC (also known as 2.5D IC ). Fig. 6.1(a) illustrates the structure of a stacked
3D IC. Multiple TSV-penetrated dies are stacked and bonded vertically. However,
the increased device density in stacked 3D ICs brings about thermal, power and
reliability issues. To alleviate these issues, 2.5D IC has been proposed. The structure
of 2.5D IC is shown in Fig. 6.1(b). Unlike the stacked 3D ICs, 2.5D IC places multiple
dies side-by-side and bonds them on a silicon interposer through fine-pitch micro-
bumps. The interposer contains horizontal chip-scale wires for inter-die connections
as well as vertical TSVs to connect with external I/O pins. Note that in 2.5D ICs,
the dies are not penetrated by the TSVs. The absence of TSVs in the dies of 2.5D
IC makes it easier to design and fabricate than the TSV-penetrated stacked 3D IC.
Although 2.5D ICs might not achieve the same amount of performance improvement
as 3D ICs, it offers better cooling options, which is essential for high-performance
computing systems. While commercial large-scale 3D IC is still being developed,
large-volume commercial 2.5D products are already in the market, such as the Xilinx
Virtex-7 2000T FPGA [95].
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6.2.2 3D/2.5D IC Based Split Fabrication
As 3D/2.5D integration is becoming a promising technology for next-generation
chip design, researchers have started to investigate it from a hardware security
perspective [96]. One line of research focuses on utilizing 3D/2.5D IC technology
to protect IC designs from being pirated or tampered during outsourced fabrica-
tion [34, 58, 62, 97–99]. In 3D integration, multiple dies (functional layers) can be
fabricated independently on separate substrates and then integrated together into
a single chip. This fabrication process offers inherent support for split fabrication.
Split fabrication, as introduced in Section 2.2.3, is a layout-level circuit obfuscation
technique. To adopt split fabrication, a designer can first partition a circuit design
into different functional layers in the 3D chips. Then, he can send a portion of the
layers at his discretion to a trusted foundry for secure fabrication while outsourcing
the rest to an untrusted foundry for state-of-the-art fabrication technology. The
final integration between two components is done in the trusted foundry. Because
some information will be hidden from the untrusted foundry, split fabrication can
prevent the supply chain attacks such as piracy, overbuilding, and counterfeiting.
The split fabrication strategy of 3D/2.5D IC is adaptable to off-the-shelf 3D/2.5D
IC fabrication process. Each die is an individual component that can be fabricated
separately and then integrated together, either in a single foundry or in different
foundries. Interconnecting separately made dies using 3D integration is already a
proven technology [59]. Thus, the extra effort for 3D/2.5D IC to adopt the split
fabrication is negligible.
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Figure 6.2: 2.5D IC based split fabrication.
In this work, we focus on 2.5D IC based split fabrication. 2.5D IC has less
severe thermal and reliability challenges while offering a comparable performance
improvement compared to the stacked 3D IC. Moreover, leveraging this 2.5D in-
tegration technology requires only minor modification to current IC design flow
and fabrication process. Fig. 6.2 illustrates the basic idea of 2.5D split fabrication.
The silicon interposer in a trusted foundry is fabricated in a trusted foundry (as
the trusted tier) while the dies are outsourced to untrusted foundries (as the un-
trusted tier). If all untrusted foundries are independent (not colluded), an attacker
in one untrusted foundry can only obtain the netlist of a die that’s fabricated in
this foundry. Even if the offshore foundries collude, they can at most obtain an in-
complete design that lacks the interconnect wires in the interposer. The incomplete
netlist will be incomprehensible if the wires in the interposer layer are intelligently
selected.
6.3 Security-aware Design Flow for 2.5D ICs
As discussed, by fabricating the interposer of 2.5D IC in a trusted foundry
while outsourcing the rest to an untrusted foundry, an attacker in the untrusted
foundry can at most obtain an incomplete netlist which lacks the wires in the inter-
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poser (the trusted tier).
However, this doesn’t imply that a conventional performance-driven 2.5D
IC design flow followed by a split fabrication strategy is security-optimal. In a
performance-driven 2.5D IC design flow, a netlist is first partitioned in a way that
minimizes the number of cut-wires to reduce the number of wires that need to be
routed in the trusted tier. Then, corresponding layouts are generated using place-
ment and routing algorithms which minimize layout area and routing wire-length.
Although a min-cut partitioning has a lower performance overhead, it might not
hide enough wires to fully obfuscate the functionality of the outsourced designs.
Also, a performance-driven placement might place two connected pins/gates close-
by, thereby leaking the information about the hidden connections that can be ex-
ploited by an attacker.
Here we introduce a security-aware 2.5D IC design and split fabrication flow
that aims at thwarting hardware IP piracy. The security-aware 2.5D IC design and
split fabrication flow is shown in Fig. 6.3. In the design stage, a gate-level netlist is
first partitioned into two parts. The cut-wires are selected as the hidden wires in the
interposer layer. After that, a placement and routing phase assigns exact physical
locations for gates in two partitions and determines the proper intra-die routing as
well as the inter-die routing in the interposer. This is followed by the fabrication
stage, where the layout files of the dies are outsourced to an untrusted foundry while
the interposer is fabricated in a trusted foundry for security. The final integration is
also implemented in the trusted foundry. Note that this design and fabrication flow
assumes only one untrusted offshore foundry that is responsible for fabricating two
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Figure 6.3: A security-aware 2.5D IC design and split fabrication flow.
dies. However, it’s possible that two dies can be outsourced to different foundries
and if these foundries are completely independent (no collusion), the information
leakage to each foundry can be reduced. Moreover, this design flow focuses only on
bi-partitioning for simplicity, but it would be possible to partition into more layouts




The attack model addressed in this work is widely used in previous anti-IP-
piracy research [27, 100]. It assumes that the attacker is an untrusted foundry that
has access to the GDSII layout files of two sub-netlists, but it lacks the knowledge
of the correct interconnection between two sub-netlists. The interconnection in the
interposer layer is not accessible to the attacker. Inferring the interconnect wires
in the interposer layer by reverse-engineering a final product from the market is
assumed thwarted by anti-reverse-engineering techniques such as camouflaged smart
filling [101].
The attacker’s goal is to retrieve the complete gate-level netlist and function-
ality. Since an ideal security-aware design will produce incorrect output logics on
applying incorrect connections, any random reconnection should lead to a com-
pletely different functionality. Therefore, the attacker’s first concern is to determine
the missing connections based on two sub-netlists and chip layout geometries, and
generate a reconstructed circuit so that he can gain profit from pirating and over-
building the IC.
6.4.2 Problem Statement
The goal of the security-aware 2.5D IC design flow is to thwart IP piracy by
producing a security-aware partitioning and placement solution that can obfuscate
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the original functionality while preventing the leakage of the correct interconnections
between two partitions. The research problem can be defined as follows:
Given a netlist of a combinational circuit and the Boolean function F that
maps its primary inputs (PIs) ~X to its primary outputs (POs) ~Y : ~Y = F ( ~X), we
want to find a bipartition and a corresponding gate-level placement result, so that
the placement result of two partitions will disclose the least functionality and netlist
of the original circuit at a minimum performance cost.
6.4.3 Security Objectives
1) Functionality Obfuscation. One objective of 2.5D split fabrication is to
obfuscate the functionality of the outsourced design (the untrusted tier). To do so,
we select and hide a set of wires into the trusted tier such that the functionality of the
untrusted tier (or a reconstructed circuit that’s inferred based on the untrusted tier)
differs substantially from the original functionality. By obfuscating the functionality,
an attacker who has the knowledge of the untrusted tier cannot infer or utilize
the functionality of the original complete design, thereby protecting the outsourced
design from piracy and overproduction. Hamming distance (HD) is widely used to
quantify the security level of functionality obfuscation [27,34,100,102]. It’s defined
as the number of different output bits between an original netlist and a reconstructed
netlist on applying the same input vector. Given one input vector ~Xi, the function
of original netlist F will produce an output vector ~Yi = F ( ~Xi), while the function
of reconstructed netlist F
′
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where n is the number of input vectors and |~Y | is the number of output bits. Since
the objective of functionality obfuscation is to restrain the attacker’s ability to infer
or utilize the correct functionality, HD(F, F
′
) approaching 50% is desirable, which
indicates that the functionality of the reconstructed netlist deviates substantially
away from the original functionality.
2) Layout Obfuscation. The security of 2.5D split fabrication rests upon the
assumption that the attacker does not know the hidden portion (the trusted tier)
and cannot infer it based on the exposed portion of design (the untrusted tier). Oth-
erwise, the attacker can reconstruct the complete design and continue to conduct
his attacks. To infer the hidden connections in the trusted tier, Rajendran et al. [27]
proposed an attack called proximity attack. The attack is based on the observation
that modern floorplanning and placement tool will place two connected pins closely
in the untrusted tier so as to reduce the wire-length. However, the physical proxim-
ity of two connected pins leaks the information of the hidden connections. Since the
layout information for each die is known to the attacker, he can iteratively connect
an output pin in one die to its closet input pin in other die and thus reconstruct the
circuit. Therefore, it’s necessary to obfuscate the layout (by placing two connected
pins far away) in order to prevent the leakage of the trusted tier in 2.5D split fabri-
cation. Proximity attack correctness is a security metric that’s used to quantify the
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layout obfuscation level under the proximity attack. For 2.5D split fabrication, it’s
defined as the percentage of correct connections that are recovered by the proximity
attack algorithm. Attack correctness approaching 0% is desirable for a secure layout
design, which indicates that the attacker cannot infer the correct connections in the
trusted tier.
Based on these two security metrics, the objective of our problem can be
formulated as follows:
minimize |HD − 50%|+ Correctness (6.2)
A secure design flow for 2.5D IC should achieve two objectives: a) incorrect function-
ality will be produced when incorrect connections are made between two partitions,
i.e., the HD between the functionalities of the original netlist and that of the netlist
reconstructed using proximity attack algorithm approaches 50%; b) the proximity
attack algorithm has 0% attack correctness.
6.5 Proposed Approach
6.5.1 Secure Partitioning
The partitioning phase plays a pivotal role in functionality obfuscation be-
cause it determines the hidden wires in the interposer layer. Fig. 6.4 illustrates
a bi-partitioning of the c17 circuit from the ISCAS85 benchmark. The cut-wires
are selected as the hidden wires that will be routed in the interposer layer. The
resulting cut-wires have a significant impact on the incorrectness of output logic of
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Figure 6.4: A bi-partitioning of the c17 circuit from ISCAS85 benchmark. The
cut-wires are selected as the hidden wires that will be routed in the interposer.
a reconstructed netlist, because they decide whether faults can be generated and
propagated to POs when incorrect connections are made.
To evaluate the capability of fault occurrence and fault propagation for a cut-
set, we utilize the concepts of controllability and observability. Controllability and
observability are two characteristics that are widely used in IC testing and security
techniques. Controllability of an internal wire is the sensitivity of the wire w.r.t.
the logic transition of PIs. It quantifies the ability to set a wire to some values (1
or 0) through PIs in order to activate a fault (due to incorrect reconnections) inside
a circuit. Observability of a wire is the sensitivity of POs w.r.t. the logic transition
of the internal wire. It quantifies the ability to observe faults in POs when the
logic value of a wire inside the circuit is flipped. In order to activate and produce
more faults when incorrect connections are made between two partitions, we aim at
selecting cut-wires with high controllability and observability. The controllability
CTRL(w) and observability OBS(w) of a wire w can be simulated and normalized
to a value between 0 to 1 [34], where 1 indicates high controllability/observability.
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The secure min-cut problem is to find a bi-partitioning with minimum cut-size
while satisfying balance constraint and security constraint. The balance constraint
ensures that two partitions have roughly equal sizes while the security constraint
enforces that the controllability and observability of the wires in the cut-set are
relatively large. The overall algorithm is based on Fiduccia-Mattheyses (FM) al-
gorithm [103], a linear time heuristic approach to solve hypergraph bi-partitioning
problem. The overall algorithm is as follows:
• Initialization: a balanced partitioning is randomly initialized so that two par-
titions have roughly equal sizes. PI pins and PO pins are separated into two
partitions. Moreover, the controllability and observability of all wires are sim-
ulated.
• Maintenance: after initialization, the FM algorithm will iteratively move a
gate that has the maximum cut-size drop from one block to another while
maintaining the following two constraints:
– Balance constraint: |A(P1)−A(P2)|
A(P1)+A(P2)
≤ Bth, where A(P1), A(P2) are the sizes
of two partitions P1 and P2, and Bth is a pre-defined balance threshold
0 ≤ Bth ≤ 1.
– Security constraint: if a gate’s output wire w is in the cut-set and it has
high controllability/observability CTRL(w)+OBS(w) ≥ Sth, then don’t
move this gate. Sth is a pre-defined security threshold 0 ≤ Sth ≤ 2.
• Termination: After all possible gate moves, the algorithm obtains a series
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of moves that will result in the most cut-size reduction, which produces a
new partitioning solution. The algorithm is continued until it cannot find a
partitioning solution with smaller cut-size. Then, a final partitioning solution
is generated and each gate is assigned to a partition.
We normally run the FM algorithm multiple times with random initial partitioning
solution and select the best partitioning solution with minimum cut-size as the final
solution.
6.5.2 Secure Placement
The placement phase is designed to thwart the proximity attack by obfuscating
the layouts of the untrusted tier so as to mislead the proximity attack algorithm into
making wrong connections. The goal of secure placement is to minimize the area,
intra-chip wire-length, inter-chip wire-length and proximity-attack correctness.
The secure 2.5D IC placement algorithm is based on a B*-tree and simulated
annealing (SA) based 2.5D IC placement algorithm proposed by Ho et al. [104].
Fig. 6.5 shows the overall flow of the secure placement algorithm. The placement
algorithm utilized the B*-tree to represent a compacted placement solution [105].
Two B*-trees are firstly constructed to represent the geometry relationship for all
gates and I/O pins of two sub-netlists. A node in the B*-tree represents a gate
or an I/O pin and each B*-tree represents a compacted placement for one sub-
netlist. Using two B*-trees allows us to optimize the placement of two sub-netlists
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Figure 6.5: B*-tree and SA based secure placement algorithm flow [34].
process, as defined in [104]:
• Rotation: the rotation of a gate or I/O pin.
• Move within a B*-tree: the move of a gate or an I/O pin within same die.
• Swap two nodes within a B*-tree: the swap of two gates or I/O pin within the
same die.
After perturbation, two new B*-trees are formed and corresponding compact place-
ments for two chips can be obtained. Based on the placement solution, we can
calculate its area, inter-chip wire-length, intra-chip wire-length and perform the
proximity attack to obtain the proximity-attack correctness. The proximity attack
algorithm will take the coordinates of I/O buffers and two sub-netlists as input data,
generate a reconnection and calculate its correctness.
133
The cost function of SA optimization is defined as:
Φ = α× Area+ β ×WLintra + γ ×WLinter + θ × Correctness (6.3)
where α, β, γ and θ are user-specified weighting parameters, Area is the total area
of two chips, WLintra is the total intra-chip wire-length, WLinter is the total inter-
chip wire-length and Correctness is the proximity-attack correctness obtained by
proximity attack algorithm. Two SA processes are used to generate an effective and
secure placement, as shown in Fig. 6.5. The first performance-driven (θ = 0) SA
process creates an initial placement that has optimized area and total wire-length.
Based on this initial placement, the second security-driven (θ 6= 0) SA process
attempts to trade-off between performance and security.
6.6 Experiments and Results
6.6.1 Experiment Setup
We examined our proposed design flow on 8 combinational circuits from ISCAS-
85 benchmarks [106] and ITC’99 benchmarks [107]. Table 6.1 shows the benchmark
details. A TSMC-180nm standard cell library is used in placement phase. The con-
trollability and observability values are computed using 1000 random input vectors
for each benchmark. Notice that using more input vectors can increase the accuracy
of estimation of these two values, but it will take longer computation time. In the
results shown below, we find that 1000 random input vectors are enough. The HD
between reconstructed netlist and original netlist is determined by 1000 random in-
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put vectors for each benchmark, which are not necessarily the same as the previous
input vectors used for computing controllability and observability.
In the partitioning phase, we set the balance threshold Bth to be 0.1. The
security threshold Sth varies from 1.01 to 1.3 for different benchmarks, which are the
ones that lead to the best tradeoff between cut-size and HD during simulation. To
study the relation between Sth, HD and cut-size, and to find the best Sth, we run the
partitioning algorithm with a set of security threshold values and calculate the HD
between randomly reconstructed netlist and original netlist. The impact of Sth on
cut-size and HD are shown in Fig. 6.6 and Fig. 6.7. As Sth increases, the cut-size and
HD decreases for all benchmarks since a large Sth indicates a loose constraint, which
means that only a few wires with high controllability and observability will be locked
in cut-set during partitioning. Based on this simulation results, we define Secure
Partitioning (SecPart) as the partitioning with Sth that makes HD larger than
40%. Also, we define Normal Partitioning (NormPart) as the partitioning that
doesn’t consider the security constraint. Since the security constraint will increase
the cut-size, one interesting question to ask is that whether we can achieve the
same HD by using the NormPart algorithm but enforce that the partitioning result
should have the same cut-size as the one produced by the SecPart algorithm. We
implement the normal partitioning with a cut-size lower-bound that’s set to the
cut-size of secure partitioning solution (denoted as NormPart LargeSize). All
the partitioning algorithms are run with 1000 random initializations and the best
solution with minimum cut-size is selected as the final solution.
In the placement phase, in order to determine the optimal weights for the cost
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Figure 6.6: Impact of security constraint
Sth on cut-size
Figure 6.7: Impact of security constraint
Sth on HD
function, we test different setups on all benchmarks and define the setup α = 0.2, β =
0.7, γ = 0.1, θ = 0 as Normal Placement (NormPlace) since it can obtain a
relatively optimal result in area and total wire-length. For Secure Placement
(SecPlace), we increase θ to 0.05 and decrease γ to 0.05. The reason we decrease
the inter-chip wire-length weight γ is that we want to weaken the correlation between
connectedness and layout proximity of inter-die I/O buffers.
6.6.2 Results
Table 6.1 shows the partitioning results of three partitioning settings, namely
NormPart, SecPart and NormPart LargeSize. Comparing NormPart and SecPart,
we can see that HD increases from 13.24% to 46.35% on average. This is because that
we have enforced the security constraint to select enough cut-wires with high control-
lability/observability so that more faults will be produced for an incorrectly recon-
structed netlist. However, the security constraint inevitably increases the cut-size
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Table 6.1: Benchmark information and partitioning results of NormPart, Norm-
Part LargeCutsize, and SecPart.
Benchmark #PIs #POs #Gates
NormPart NormPart LargeSize SecPart
Cutsize HD Cutsize HD Cutsize HD
c499 41 32 202 16 0.86% 45 48.20% 45 49.84%
c1355 41 32 546 16 7.08% 43 45.01% 43 49.96%
c1908 33 25 880 35 20.09% 37 33.46% 37 44.79%
c3540 50 22 1669 57 32.82% 74 33.28% 74 42.67%
c5315 178 123 2307 30 8.65% 168 19.13% 168 41.07%
c7552 207 108 3512 25 5.46% 155 14.34% 155 48.55%
b14 1 277 299 4048 99 14.85% 386 19.14% 386 44.76%
b15 485 519 7022 168 16.14% 625 27.76% 625 49.12%
Average - - - 56 13.24% 192 30.04% 192 46.35%
of secure partitioning. As seen, the cut-size of SecPart is 3.4× the cut-size of Norm-
Part on average. The extra cut-wires will increase the performance overhead such
as area and wire-length in the placement phase. Comparing NormPart LargeSize
and SecPart, we can see that although these two cases have the same cut-size, Sec-
Part can ensure 46.35% HD while NormPart LargeSize can only achieve 30.04% HD.
Therefore, with security constraint, the secure partitioning algorithm can achieve
50% HD more efficiently.
In order to evaluate the overall design flow, we compare four possible combi-
nations, namely NormPart + NormPlace, NormPart + SecPlace, SecPart + Norm-
Place and SecPart + SecPlace in terms of attack correctness, Hamming distance,
area and total wire-length.
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Figure 6.8: HD and attack correctness for four design flows.
Fig. 6.8 shows the correctness and HD of proximity attack for four cases. For
‘NormPart+NormPlace’, the attack correctness is 20.13% and HD is only 11.98%
because no security constraint is enforced in the NormPart to conceal the functional-
ity, and the NormPlace doesn’t minimize attack correctness during SA optimization.
When SecPlace is performed on NormPart, we can see that the attack correctness
is limited to 0.22%, and the HD increases to 13.24%, which is still far below 50% as
a large amount of functionality is exposed due to the normal min-cut partitioning.
For the case ‘SecPart+NormPlace’, the HD increases to 43.87%, which proves the
effectiveness of SecPart in concealing the functionality of a design. Finally, if we
perform SecPlace on top of SecPart, compared to the ‘SecPart+NormPlace’ case,
the attack correctness is reduced from 9.00% to 0.27% and the HD increases from
43.87% to 46.35%. The ‘SecPart+SecPlace’ design flow achieves the optimal security
among four design flows. Overall, the SecPart algorithm is capable of approaching
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Figure 6.9: Area and total wire-length overhead for four design flows.
50% HD, and the SecPlace algorithm can effectively achieve 0% attack correctness.
Fig. 6.9 shows the area and total wire-length for four cases. Chip area and
wire-length are two metrics that are commonly used to evaluate the performance
of gate placement algorithm [104]. The ‘NormPart+NormPlace’ design flow is con-
sidered as a baseline for calculating overheads. As seen, the main overheads come
from the SecPart, as it requires a larger cut-set than NormPart to ensure 50% HD,
which will inevitably increase the area and wire-length. The average overheads for
SecPart are 5.29% on the area and 14.27% on total wire-length. The SecPlace al-
gorithm contributes to additional overhead because it perturbs the layout geometry
to produce a placement with 0% attack correctness. Overall, the average overheads
for ‘SecPart+SecPlace’ design flow are 8.95% on the area and 17.27% on total wire-
length.
Finally, we study the tradeoff between a more gradual degradation in cut-
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Normal 25 272053 0% 1048730 0% 8.00% 5.45%
Secure
25 274075 0.74% 1058320 0.91% 0% 5.46%
65 283525 4.22% 1106230 5.48% 0% 20.31%
105 280691 3.18% 1133420 8.08% 0% 31.34%
145 281941 3.63% 1169020 11.47% 0% 38.53%
155 290849 6.91% 1197160 14.15% 0% 48.55%
size and the security obtained, since the large cut-size due to the secure min-cut
algorithm is the main source of performance overhead. Our objective is to study
the impact of security constraint threshold Sth on cut-size and HD, and perform
tradeoff analysis between HD and performance.
We use the c7552 circuit to demonstrate the tradeoff between HD and perfor-
mance due to its large cut-size increase between normal and secure min-cut. The
cut-size decreases from 155, which is the cut-size when the security threshold Sth is
set to 1.2. By gradually increasing the security threshold Sth to 2, the algorithm
will produce solutions with less cut-size. For a set of partitioning solutions with less
cut-size, we perform secure placement and proximity attack and calculate the HD
between the reconstructed netlist and the original netlist.
Table 6.2 shows the tradeoff between security and performance. NormPart+NormPlace
is used as a baseline for calculating overheads. Our approach is capable of generating
a tradeoff between security and other performance parameters. For performance-
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driven designs, we can increase the security threshold Sth to produce a partitioning
with less cut-size.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a security-aware physical design flow for 2.5D IC
to counter IP piracy in outsourced fabrication. In partitioning phase, we propose
a secure partitioning algorithm that can generate a bipartition with 46.35% HD
on applying incorrect reconnection. In placement phase, we equip an SA-based
placement algorithm with proximity attack correctness evaluation which limits the
correctness of proximity attack to 0.27%. Experiment results have shown that our
approach is capable of generating layout files that are fully obfuscated and resilient to
proximity attack at a low performance cost. In addition, a tradeoff between security
and other performance parameters has been shown which could be utilized by chip
designer to estimate the performance overhead for a certain security improvement.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In Chapter 1, we summarized various hardware-based attacks in different
phases of an IC’s life cycle. The main goal of our work is to develop design ob-
fuscation techniques to enhance the security of outsourced IC designs that are fabri-
cated in possibly untrustworthy foundries. These techniques can help building trust
between IC design companies and fabrication foundries so as to create a win-win
scenario. In Chapter 2, we provided background on IC supply chain attacks and
discussed countermeasures such as logic locking and split fabrication.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we investigated emerging attacks on logic locking
techniques and proposed new locking techniques that can thwart such attacks in
a provably-secure manner. Specifically, Chapter 3 presented a circuit block called
Anti-SAT that can mitigate the SAT attack on logic locking. We show that the
number of iterations required by the SAT attack to reveal the correct key in the
Anti-SAT block is an exponential function of the key-size, thereby making the attack
computationally infeasible. The Anti-SAT block is integrated into a locked circuit to
increase its resistance to the SAT attack. A unified obfuscation technique has been
proposed to protect the Anti-SAT block from potential removal attacks. Based on
Anti-SAT, Chapter 4 investigated both attack and defense methodologies for locked
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neural chips. We proposed new attack methodology that exploits existing AppSAT
attack and neural model fine-tuning in effective ways. To counter this attack, we
proposed a secure locking scheme based on a co-design of the locking infrastructure
(called Strong Anti-SAT) and the functional modules. These proposed techniques
were validated with rigorous proof and extensive experiments.
In Chapter 5, we explored new opportunities in obfuscating the timing profile
of a circuit design and proposed the delay locking technique. For delay locking,
the key to a locked circuit not only determines its functionality, but also its timing
profile. A functionality-correct but timing-incorrect key will result in timing viola-
tions, hence making the circuit malfunction. Such locking scheme can thwart many
functionality-oriented attacks (e.g., SAT attack) because they cannot be utilized to
decipher a timing-correct key.
In Chapter 6, we studied the security implications of 3D/2.5D ICs and pro-
posed a security-aware physical design flow for 2.5D IC to counter supply chain
attacks in outsourced fabrication. Simulation results show that our design flow is
effective for producing secure chip layouts for outsourcing whose original netlist
and functionality cannot be reverse-engineered based on the layout-geometry infor-
mation. A trade-off between security and other performance parameters has been
shown which could be utilized by chip designer to estimate the performance overhead
for a certain security improvement.
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7.1 Future Work
In this dissertation, we have developed various unconventional design obfusca-
tion techniques to enhance the hardware security. There are still many possibilities
for improvement. The following summarizes potential future research directions to
extend the research work presented in this dissertation.
7.1.1 Security in Emerging Hardware Designs
In recent years, researchers have proposed numerous innovative hardware de-
signs and architectures that are different from conventional circuit designs. Neural
network chip, as discussed in Chapter 4, is one example of the emerging hardware.
Another emerging hardware design that has not been discussed in this dissertation
is called approximate computing circuit. Unlike conventional circuits, the approxi-
mate circuit is a hardware that trades computation correctness/quality for reduced
power and area. By design, the approximate circuit can output incorrectly at a tol-
erably low frequency and magnitude, but it can save a significant amount of power
and area. Existing research on approximate computing focuses mainly on improv-
ing its performance and reliability. However, the security aspect of these emerging
hardware is not fully investigated. We are interested in studying the security and
vulnerability implications of these technologies. We plan to investigate the effec-
tiveness of existing supply chain attacks on these new hardware designs and look
for new countermeasures to improve their security. New attack model assumptions
and new security metrics shall also be investigated for evaluating the security level
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of these novel hardware designs and architectures.
7.1.2 Parametric Locking
Conventional logic locking techniques purely focus on the Boolean logic level.
Thus, they are subject to logic-analysis based attacks such as the SAT attack. In
Chapter 5, we explored new obfuscation possibility by obfuscating the timing profile
of a circuit. Moving forward, we plan to investigate new circuit locking techniques
that obfuscate other parameters of a circuit such as power, heat dissipation and
so on. We refer this type of locking as parametric locking. By doing so, a key
to a locked circuit would not only determines its functionality, but also its para-
metric behavior. A functionality-correct but parameter-incorrect key will result in
parametric violations (such as power or temperature violations) and thus make the
circuit malfunction or deviate from its normal behavior. The advantage of paramet-
ric locking is that it’s immune to logic-analysis based attack because the parametric
locking does not depend on the Boolean logic. Besides, analog components (such
as power management, heat dissipation) are parts of hardware IPs that would be
attractive to attackers, but corresponding obfuscation techniques for these compo-
nents are not fully investigated in existing literature. Obfuscating these subsidiary
circuit components is an interesting future research direction.
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7.1.3 3D IC Security
While 3D integration is initially developed to overcome the obstacles in device
miniaturization, it has presented various security advantages in different security
techniques and applications. The stacking structure and high-density nature of 3D
integration offer a natural defense for side-channel attacks as it adds significantly
more complexity for an attacker to extract a meaningful signal from the compli-
cated background noise. Moreover, reverse-engineering becomes challenging since
hardware designs can be protected inside the firmly stacked substrates. In addition,
with 3D heterogeneous integration, novel non-CMOS security primitives can be in-
tegrated with CMOS processor to achieve a comprehensive system with optimal
security and performance. As for future works, we would like to investigate design
techniques for 3D ICs that utilize these unique advantages to thwart hardware-based
attacks. With the effort made in 3D IC security characterization and modeling, fu-
ture chip designers can take security into consideration at an early phase of the
design while optimizing the chip for performance and power.
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